By Olaf Leiße

After winning the constitutional referendum, President Erdoğan is preparing Turkey for a transformation into a presidential republic. The European Union has little influence on domestic political developments, but should not let the talks break off.

The referendum to amend the constitution

The constitutional referendum on April 16, 2017 was a political earthquake for Turkey. Since then, the country has been preparing for the transformation of its political system into a presidential republic, which is likely to take effect after the 2019 presidential elections. Despite the massive campaign in the run-up to the referendum, which systematically harassed opponents of the reform, despite a government that did not shy away from repressive measures including arrests and which also brought the media into line, the result was not as clear-cut as observers expected and Erdoğan wanted. With 51% in favor and 49% against, the decision was extremely close. The inner Anatolian provinces mainly voted in favor of the constitutional amendment, while the coastal provinces, the European part and the provinces with a majority Kurdish population voted against.

In Germany, on the other hand, 63% voted in favor of the reform and only 37% against. This continued a trend that could already be observed in the 2014 presidential election, when Erdoğan and the AKP won more votes in Germany than in Turkey in percentage terms. Turks in Austria, France, Belgium and the Netherlands voted similarly conservatively. In the UK, however, only 20% voted in favor of the reform, while 80% were against. Even though there are fifteen times more eligible voters in Germany than in the UK, the voting behavior should be a reason to enter into closer discussions with the Turkish community.

The new system of rule

In the run-up to the referendum, supporters of the presidential system argued that a strong president at the head of the country promised stability and continuity. They said that the United States of America, on whose model the new constitution will be modeled, was a good example. As the USA is generally considered to be very democratic, the transformation of the political system in Turkey would also strengthen democracy.

In fact, a presidential system is no more or less democratic than a parliamentary system. Both systems have their peculiarities, their strengths and weaknesses, which are further emphasized by their specific implementation in the individual countries. What is special in the case of Turkey is that a country wants to adopt a new system without a historical upheaval, without a profound break, which is not rooted in history and will change, if not overthrow, all previous political traditions.

Developments in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism in 1989 show that the presidential system was initially preferred there. The hope of both the former ruling communists and the opposition was to obtain sufficient power to shape the upcoming transformation process. Once in office, the president could "rule through" without any troublesome coalitions or considerations. In contrast, a parliamentary system requires greater cooperation between political actors, a greater willingness to reach consensus and a general ability to compromise. In Eastern Europe, aspects of parliamentary democracy have been increasingly incorporated into the constitution in recent years. Turkey is now taking the opposite approach. Parliamentarianism is being abolished in favor of presidentialism. This increases the susceptibility to autocratic and possibly dictatorial forms of government, because the checks and balances that form the essence of American democracy are absent in Turkey. While in the USA judges can overrule presidential decrees even at lower levels, Erdoğan's power appears to be unlimited. There is no strong parliament as a corrective to the president, no independent legal system, no free development for parties beyond the AKP, no freedom of the press. Since the framework conditions are not right, the future presidential system will probably be little more than a defective democracy - if at all.

If the parliamentary system is abolished with the 2019 election, then it must also be said that this system has only worked in Turkey for short periods of time. Cooperation and consensus have never been the strengths of Turkish politicians, and in the years before Erdoğan took office, the military maintained control over political developments or intervened in politics itself in the form of coups. Even in recent years, parliamentarianism has only been a façade. The cabinets of the prime ministers - until May 2016 Ahmet Davutoğlu, since then Binali Yıldırım - were informally formed by Erdoğan and ultimately confirmed by him. De facto, it has been a presidential system since Erdoğan's election in 2014. As even Erdoğan could not permanently violate the spirit of the constitution, the political system had to be reformed. With the introduction of the presidential system, the current parliamentary sham democracy in Turkey will be abolished, but at the cost of Erdoğan being able to act even more independently of other actors in the future and thus rule in a more authoritarian manner.

The future of Turkish-European relations

How should Europe react to Erdoğan's transformation of Turkey into a possibly super-presidential state? There is certainly no silver bullet, but there are many wooden paths. It should not be forgotten that despite the numerous repressive measures under Erdoğan's almost 15-year rule, parts of Turkish civil society are still oriented towards Europe. Islamic values may be spreading rapidly, but Europe's secular influence still exists. Breaking off relations with Turkey would strengthen the hardliners in Turkey, those who tend to focus on conservative values and Islamic rigorism. This cannot be in the interests of the European states. Turkey, as it currently presents itself, will certainly not be able to become a member of the European Union. But what would be gained by ending the accession negotiations? A farce would be over, for sure, the Potemkin villages would be destroyed and it would correspond to the alienation between the two partners. No one would have to accommodate the other side, show consideration, feign understanding, maintain the masquerade. But what would be the concrete benefit for the EU? Officially breaking off the accession negotiations, which are currently only being conducted on paper, would strengthen Erdoğan's domestic policy, not weaken it. The country would become further Islamized and alienated from Europe.

The European Union is therefore right to react with a policy of clear words and tangible pinpricks. The European Parliament's resolution of July 2017 called for the accession process to be suspended, but not terminated. The European Council followed this line in October when it denounced the "unsatisfactory human rights situation" and regretted that it had not been possible to bring Turkey closer to Europe's rule of law standards. A reform of the customs union, which currently puts Turkish entrepreneurs at a disadvantage, has been put on hold, as has visa liberalization. In addition, the considerable pre-accession aid is to be cut. These measures make it clear to the strong man in Ankara that his foreign policy power is limited. At the same time, contacts with Turkey, which are urgently needed when the transformation into a presidential republic becomes acute, are not breaking down. Ultimately, as Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek put it, it is not crucial to join the EU. It can also be associated in other ways. What is crucial for Europe is not to lose Turkey.