By Jürgen Wagner

The adoption of the Permanent Structured Cooperation between the EU member states is generally regarded as a success of European integration. However, it promotes the militarization of security and defence policy under Franco-German leadership.

On November 23, 2017, 23 EU countries signed a "notification paper" in which they formally expressed their interest in participating in the "Permanent Structured Cooperation", or PESCO for short. While this step was almost unanimously welcomed as a "milestone" on the way to a "European Defense Union", a critical view will be presented here. Under Franco-German leadership, PESCO is intended to establish a system that replaces consensus with coercion and forces the member states into an armaments corset with tangible threats of sanctions, which is likely to cause immense costs and further exacerbate the centrifugal tendencies that can already be observed in the Union. As a result, a hierarchically structured European military power is taking on an ever more concrete form, whose false priorities are increasingly focused on the - if necessary violent - enforcement of economic and/or strategic interests.

Franco-German leadership role

PESCO makes it possible to outsource parts of EU military policy to a small group of states. At the same time, it introduces qualified majority decisions (65% of the EU population and 55% of the EU member states) on certain issues. This partially undermines the previously valid consensus principle in the military sector, giving Germany and France a de facto blocking minority and thus massive gains in influence. The initiation of PESCO military projects must still be decided by consensus, but only the participating states are entitled to vote. If a country decides to participate at a later date, this requires a qualified majority of those already in the PESCO boat. As a result, there is a risk of being relegated to the side table of EU military policy due to the Franco-German blocking minority. This is likely to have been the reason why, despite widespread skepticism, 25 states - with only the UK, Denmark and Malta left out - ultimately decided to participate before the final Council decision to activate PESCO on December 11, 2017.

This was not a matter of course: in spring 2017, a study by the European Council on Foreign Relations came to the conclusion that no fewer than 18 member states were undecided or even opposed to PESCO. During this phase, the FAZ (25.3.2017) summarized the concerns of many small and medium-sized member states with the following words: "Many other Europeans were not enthusiastic about it [PESCO]. [...] The term 'core Europe' is no more popular. Others are quick to think of a German central star with a whole bunch of planets orbiting around it."

These concerns quickly proved to be all too justified: The fact that Berlin and Paris agreed on a compromise at the Franco-German summit on July 13, 2017, which was then put in front of the other countries and ultimately adopted, already showed which countries were in charge of PESCO. The summit's final declaration stated succinctly: "France and Germany [have] agreed on a series of binding commitments and elements for an inclusive and ambitious PESCO."

Armament pressure

These "commitments" mean that states willing to participate must literally pay a price, which is that the "PESCO participation amendment" is linked to the willingness to meet certain armaments criteria. A list of the 20 Franco-German participation conditions is attached to the notification paper and the Council decision. These include the obligation to participate in the "Coordinated Annual Defense Review". This is intended to identify and drive forward military projects of strategic interest across Europe in future, with PESCO requiring participants to take part in "at least one project" of this kind. It is hoped that pooling the armaments sector will lead to a considerable increase in military power, which is why the criteria also include the "commitment to develop harmonized requirements" and the "commitment to agree on common technical and operational standards of the armed forces" as well as the "commitment to consider the joint use of existing capabilities".

Cost drivers

The first 17 PESCO projects were agreed in March 2018, ranging from rather inconspicuous projects such as the establishment of an EU medical command to the development of a new infantry vehicle. Further PESCO projects are to be adopted before the end of this year; for example, it is being discussed whether the construction of a Franco-German combat aircraft or the French initiative to build up intervention forces should be transferred to the PESCO framework.

In order to "improve" the financing of this and other armaments expenditure, concrete criteria are also specified in this area. They include greater "joint financing of CSDP military operations", a "gradual increase in investment spending on defense equipment to 20% of total defense spending" and a commitment to a "regular real increase in defense budgets." Furthermore, there is a "commitment to the intensive involvement of a future European Defense Fund".

Proposals for the "European Defense Fund" (EDF) have been circulating for some time, from which PESCO projects would be preferentially financed in the future (part of which would come from the member states, part directly from the EU budget). It is to be launched in a slimmed-down form from 2019 and in the Commission draft for the EU budget 2021 to 2027 presented at the beginning of May 2018, up to 48.5 billion euros are earmarked for the EDF for the research and development of armaments (plus 6.5 billion for "military mobility", which will probably also be used to co-finance the PESCO project of the same name). Article 42(2) of the EU Treaty prohibits the use of EU funds for "measures [of EU foreign and security policy] having military or defense implications". However, the Commission solved this problem by simply reclassifying the EVF funds as measures to promote competition.

Coercion and sanctions

Much to the displeasure of Germany and France, small and medium-sized member states previously had a considerable say in EU military policy issues thanks to the consensus principle - this also meant that they could, if they wished, keep out of costly armaments projects. This is set to change with PESCO, as in future significantly more costs will be socialized and non-compliance can be sanctioned. To this end, a final criterion stipulates that the EU Defense Agency must undergo an annual audit to determine whether the PESCO requirements have been "satisfactorily" met. If it comes to the conclusion that a country is not fulfilling its obligations, Article 46(4) of the EU Treaty even provides the legal option of withdrawing a country from PESCO - by qualified majority! - to throw a country out of PESCO again.

It takes little imagination to imagine that it is this threat that, from a German and French perspective, is the real charm of PESCO. Only time will tell whether sanctions will actually be imposed on states unwilling to arm themselves - but should this happen, it is likely to further fuel existing resentment towards a Franco-German core Europe.

Wrong priorities

PESCO is intended to implement the EU Global Strategy of June 2016, which aims to build up "autonomous top-level military capabilities". Presumably in the belief that PESCO is primarily intended to save costs, stable majorities in Germany are also in favor of greater integration of the EU defence sector. However, it is doubtful whether this would be the case if it were openly stated that the goals defined in the EU global strategy were to be achieved more "efficiently" - militarily if necessary. This is because the document lists "open and fair economic systems" and "access to resources" as well as the "protection" of trade routes as "interests". The countries of "Central Asia" to the east and all states to the south up to "Central Africa" are named as potential areas of operation, while at the same time it is important to secure the sea routes in the "Indian Ocean" as well as "the Gulf of Guinea to the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca."

Instead of rashly replacing the previous system based on negotiation and consensus with one that relies on arms pressure and sanctions and could fundamentally change the character of the EU, a serious discussion about the sense or nonsense of a military apparatus whose uselessness in terms of peace policy is only further confirmed with each new deployment should finally be held first.