By Stephanie Liechtenstein

Forty years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the founding document of today's Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the organization is confronted with the fact that all the principles of this Final Act have been violated in the course of the Ukraine conflict. Nevertheless, the OSCE was able to assert itself as a central mediator in the crisis and contribute to defusing the conflict. However, the OSCE and the Panel of Eminent Persons appointed by the OSCE Troika in December 2014 must think beyond the immediate conflict resolution mechanisms and address the primary causes of the renewed East-West confrontation.

The Helsinki Final Act as a diplomatic masterpiece

40 years ago, on August 1, 1975, 35 heads of state and government signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The document, which deals with questions of security in Europe, was the result of two years of intensive negotiations between the 7 Warsaw Pact states, the 15 NATO states and 13 neutral countries. The Final Act is not a treaty under international law, but a political declaration of intent. Nevertheless, the states haggled over every sentence and every word until the very end.

The Final Act is a diplomatic masterpiece, as it initially seemed to reflect the interests and goals of the Soviet Union and the West in equal measure. When the Final Act was signed, both sides had the impression that they had emerged victorious from the negotiations: The Soviet Union had achieved the establishment of the borders of the post-war order, while the West was able to chalk up the inclusion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Final Act.

The so-called 'three baskets' of Helsinki emerged as a compromise: the first basket mainly covered military security issues, the second cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment and the third respect for human rights and cultural exchange. One of the most important achievements of the Helsinki Final Act was also the Decalogue (as part of the first basket), which contains ten principles governing the behavior of states towards each other and towards their citizens.

The CSCE follow-up meetings in Belgrade (1977-78), Madrid (1980-83) and Vienna (1986-1989) served to review compliance with the Final Act and to continue the dialog between East and West during the Cold War. These conferences increased the pressure on the Soviet regime in Moscow to comply with the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the Final Act. Emerging Helsinki groups and a number of other civil society organizations (such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and Solidarnosc in Poland) invoked the Helsinki Final Act and demanded compliance with it. The CSCE process and the Final Act thus made an important contribution to ending the Cold War.

The OSCE as an important mediator in the Ukraine crisis

Today, 40 years later, it must be noted that since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, all principles of the Final Act (especially those of the Decalogue) have been violated and no longer seem to apply. By annexing Crimea in March 2014 and providing military support to the rebels in eastern Ukraine, Russia has disregarded the principles of the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fulfillment of obligations under international law.

Despite the violation of these important principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE, which emerged from the CSCE, established itself as the most uncontroversial and important mediator during the Ukraine crisis under the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship in 2014 . All OSCE participating states - including Russia and Ukraine - unanimously decided to send an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in March 2014. In addition, the OSCE Trilateral Contact Group was able to negotiate a ceasefire(Minsk agreements) for eastern Ukraine. These conflict resolution mechanisms are of central importance and help to defuse the conflict.

The ceasefire is currently being largely observed. However, a final decision on the status of eastern Ukraine and a political agreement have not yet been reached. Whether this agreement will be reached in the near future is questionable, as it currently looks as if Russia is aiming for another so-called 'frozen conflict' in eastern Ukraine - as this could serve Moscow's strategic and realpolitik interests. It would therefore appear that the OSCE's important conflict resolution mechanisms are only combating a symptom and not the real cause.

Reasons for the renewed East-West confrontation

In order to understand the renewed confrontation between Russia and the West, it is necessary to take a historical look at the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In February 1990, negotiations began between the Soviet Union, America, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Great Britain and France on the reunification of Germany (Two-plus-Four Treaty). In the course of these negotiations, the possibility of a reunified Germany joining NATO was also discussed. The Western powers supported such an accession, but this was difficult for the Soviet Union for reasons of realpolitik and security policy.

Now historians and politicians of the time are divided as to whether Moscow was given a promise at the time to expand NATO 'no inch further' to the east. This was on the condition that the Soviet Union agreed to the reunification of Germany - and ultimately to a reunified Germany joining NATO.

It is not the aim of this article to assess this. However, it is important to note that the statements were not recorded in a treaty at the time and there is therefore room for different interpretations. The fact is that Russia and the West have different interpretations of the statements made at the time and this has resulted in a constantly escalating tension - which continues to this day.

During the 1990s, Russia also made several attempts to transform the OSCE into a treaty-based security organization with a decision-making body similar to the UN Security Council. [1] According to Moscow, this would put Russia on an equal footing with its Western partners within a pan-European security organization. This demand became particularly important for Moscow after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Although this concept was initially supported by some EU states (until around 1994), it failed to gain acceptance and in fact NATO's eastward enlargement began in 1999 with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

However, it is important to note that NATO did not leave Russia out completely. In 1994 Russia was accepted into the 'Partnership for Peace' and in 1997 the NATO-Russia Council was founded and the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security' was signed.

However, further NATO eastward expansions in 2004 and 2009 led to a growing sense of insecurity in Russia. NATO's borders moved ever closer to Russia. This was perceived as particularly provocative in Russia, as the West had promised in 1990 - from a Russian perspective - that it would not do this.

And this is where the conflict in eastern Ukraine comes into play. When Ukraine was about to sign an association agreement with the EU under former President Viktor Yanukovych, Moscow intervened. This was because a Western rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU (and possibly NATO at a later date) would not be in Russia's geopolitical and strategic interests. Ukraine represents a buffer between Russia and NATO, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet is stationed in Sevastopol under a treaty signed in 1997 and 2010 respectively. A western orientation of Ukraine could jeopardize all of this in the eyes of Moscow. The annexation of Crimea, which is illegal under international law, and the military support for the rebels in eastern Ukraine should be seen in this context - however, this is not an attempt to justify Russia's actions in the Ukraine conflict, but merely to clarify the possible motives.

A frozen conflict therefore serves Russia's interests, as it keeps Ukraine divided and makes it more difficult for the country to move closer to the West. Other frozen conflicts, such as that over Transnistria or Abkhazia and South Ossetia, follow a similar logic.

Dialogue to tackle the causes

In order to solve the core of the problem, the OSCE must therefore, in addition to the important conflict resolution mechanisms such as the Special Monitoring Mission or the Trilateral Contact Group, establish a permanent dialog with Russia within the OSCE that deals with combating the causes.

The OSCE is particularly well suited to this, as it brings together all relevant states on an equal basis and defines the concept of security in an all-encompassing way. The OSCE is the only regional security organization under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter in which Russia is on an equal footing with America, the European states and the successor states of the Soviet Union. This is because the OSCE is governed by the principle of consensus, according to which decisions can only be made unanimously.

Another advantage of the OSCE is that the organization understands the concept of security not only in military terms (as is the case in NATO), but also includes the economic component and recognizes the importance of and respect for human rights for security. This definition is based on the three Helsinki baskets described above. It allows the security dialog in the OSCE to be expanded thematically.

Furthermore, in the course of the Ukraine crisis, it has become clear that the OSCE is perceived by all parties to the conflict as a neutral actor that does not pursue any economic or other self-interests.

Above all, the OSCE has proven since the 1970s that it is the only forum in which dialog between East and West can be maintained even during difficult crises. The dialog has not been interrupted, not even during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the two wars in Chechnya (1994-1996 and 1999-2009), the war between Georgia and Russia (2008) and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine since 2014.

All these aspects make the OSCE the ideal forum for a dialog on the causes of the renewed East-West confrontation. The aim of this dialog should be to achieve a common understanding of history in order to achieve reconciliation and to be able to shape the future together with new ideas. A commission of historians could support the dialog.

This idea (and a number of other points) was put forward in a recently published report by the OSCE Think Tank Network. The network is based on an idea of the OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier. It was formally established at an OSCE security conference in June 2013. The network currently comprises 44 research institutions from 33 countries in the OSCE area. The network is an informal Track II initiative that has set itself the goal of presenting innovative proposals for solving existing security problems in the OSCE area. The Track II initiative is particularly important in the area of politically sensitive issues, as it can develop scientifically sound proposals outside the political and ideological trenches.

The network's recommendations are addressed to the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons, which was commissioned in 2014 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger to draw up recommendations for strengthening European security. The Panel of Eminent Persons was appointed by the OSCE Troika at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel in December 2014, as the 57 OSCE participating States were unable to agree on a substantive ministerial declaration in Basel regarding the design of the European security architecture and the role of the OSCE in it(Helsinki+40 process). The Panel of Eminent Persons consists of representatives of the 57 OSCE participating States and is tasked with presenting its final report at the beginning of December. This is eagerly awaited. It is to be hoped that it will contain proposals that address the causes of today's East-West tensions.

SOURCES

[1] Compare with: Wolfgang Zellner (2005) 'Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment'. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, Issue 3, pp. 389-402;
P. Terrence Hopmann (2010) 'Intergovernmental Organizations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia: The OSCE'. In Maria Raquel Freire and Roger E. Kanet (Eds.) Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia: The Return of the Great Game (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan).