By Charlotte Dany
Humanitarian aid is increasingly becoming a political instrument of conflict resolution. To what extent does this development contribute to the politicization of humanitarian aid and why do humanitarian NGOs in particular object to it?
Humanitarian aid is aimed at people in need of protection, often in wars and violent conflicts. It aims to alleviate acute suffering and protect people from violence. Due to these functions, political institutions are increasingly trying to integrate humanitarian aid actors and instruments into their conflict resolution strategies: to combat the causes of flight, prevent disasters or at least mitigate their disastrous effects on societies and states. This is expressed in numerous newer political strategies, such as the German government's development and structure-building transitional aid (ESÜH) and preparedness approach, or the resilience approach and the comprehensive approach, which are propagated at international level, particularly by the European Union (EU).
However, for many humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are directly active in the affected areas and are therefore referred to as implementing partners of the donor institutions, these strategies are problematic. They find that their work becomes 'politicized' as a result. The politicization of humanitarian aid is a somewhat ambiguous term that can encompass all sorts of things. In particular, however, it refers to the changes that have been taking place in the practice of humanitarian aid since the 1990s, which are softening the classic guiding principles of humanitarian aid formulated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - in particular humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.
Is it all a question of principles?
The ICRC's humanitarian principles are still very important to humanitarian NGOs, as they are to many states and, in particular, the EU Commission as the world's largest donor of humanitarian aid. However, most humanitarian NGOs are not primarily concerned that political strategies will weaken the fundamental values on which their work is based. It has long been clear that adherence to these principles does not always work in practice anyway and that there are situations in which it is appropriate to deviate from a purely principled approach and adopt a decidedly political stance. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), for example, has long advocated this pragmatic approach. In certain situations, the organization raises its voice to bear witness to crimes against humanity and thus intervenes politically in conflicts. This can also be at the expense of access to those in need. Even if the fundamental principles remain central, it is by no means taboo to shake them up, reflect on their usefulness and question them depending on the situation and context. So what exactly do humanitarian NGOs fear when they become part of a more concerted conflict resolution strategy of states, international organizations and military actors, which is supposed to benefit people in need in particular?
Loss of distinctiveness
Discussions betweenstakeholders at EU and German level show that these strategies are particularly controversial because they make it more difficult to distinguish humanitarian organizations from other organizations. However, this differentiation, especially between humanitarian and military organizations, should be maintained, as the NGO umbrella organization VENRO, among others, demands (VENRO 2013). If the boundaries between the actors become blurred, this can have a negative impact on the provision of humanitarian aid.
Access and security problems
For example, the Comprehensive Approach (European Commission/High Commissioner 2013) has been criticized because it could link humanitarian actors too closely with military actors. The closer the cooperation, the greater the risk of instrumentalization by security policy actors, but also of access problems to those affected. In addition, many organizations, including the EU Parliament, see the danger that humanitarian aid workers themselves are more likely to become targeted victims of attacks if they are perceived as part of a comprehensive Western security strategy. Even if the connection is difficult to prove empirically, in certain particularly conflict-prone contexts - such as Afghanistan, Sudan (Darfur), Somalia and Syria - there is clear evidence of targeted violence against humanitarian aid workers or their infrastructure (hospitals). It is therefore hardly surprising that insecurity is spreading among humanitarian aid workers. This insecurity in turn leads tosecuritization, which manifests itself in a retreat to barricaded security zones or in increased security training (Duffield 2012). This ultimately increases the distance between the aid workers and the people affected by a disaster.
Approaching development policy goals
Boundaries should also be overcome between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, for example through the EU's resilience strategy. This aims to strengthen resilience - understood as "the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks" - in conflict-affected contexts (European Commission 2012). This shifts the focus away from emergency measures towards longer-term measures, which the EU also justifies in terms of greater cost efficiency. Many humanitarian organizations certainly see the need to improve the transition from humanitarian emergency aid to development policy and agree with the idea of strengthening people and societies. However, many stakeholders in the EU consultation process on the resilience strategy criticized that this could change the focus from a clearneeds-based approach to humanitarian aid to a stronger cost-benefit calculation. As resilience also includes the idea that crises mean opportunities and that societies could even be put in a better state after a disaster than before, this could even contribute to the idea of protection being neglected and questions of disaster management coming to the fore instead (Duffield 2015). The implementation of a resilience strategy can therefore be expected to lead to changes in the practice of humanitarian aid, the benefits and costs of which have yet to be seen.
Stakeholder concerns indicate that the new political strategies in Germany and at EU level run the risk of hindering humanitarian aid measures rather than improving them.
SOURCES
AA 2012: Strategy of the Federal Foreign Office on humanitarian aid abroad, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/631154/publicationFile/174169/121115_AA-Strategie_humanitaere_hilfe.pdf, 12.11.2012.
BMZ 2013: Strategy for development and structure-building transitional aid (ESÜH). Strengthening resilience - creating transitions, BMZ Strategy Paper 6/2013, https://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/archiv/reihen/strategiepapiere/Strategiepapier330_06_2013.pdf, 30.06.2013.
Dany, Charlotte 2015: Politicization of Humantarian Aid in the European Union, European Foreign Affairs Review 20:3, 419-437.
Dany, Charlotte 2016: Controversial politicization processes: On the strategic reorientation of humanitarian aid in Germany and the EU, Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies 5: 1, 7-33.
Duffield, Mark 2012: Challenging Environments. Danger, Resilience and the Aid Industry, Security Dialogue 43: 5, 475-492.
Duffield, Mark 2015: From Protection to Disaster Resilience, in: Mac Ginty, Roger/Peterson, Jenny H. (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Humantarian Action, London, 26-37.
European Commission 2012: The EU Approach to Resilience. Learning from Food Security Crises, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/com_2012_586_resilience_en.pdf, 3.10.2012.
European Commission/High Commissioner 2013: Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, Brussels, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf, 11.12.2013.
ICRC 2016: IHL and humanitarian principles, https://www.icrc.org/en/ihl-and-humanitarian-principles, 6.10.2016.
VENRO 2013: Recommendations on interaction between VENRO member organizations and the German Armed Forces, http://www.venro.org/fileadmin/redaktion/dokumente/Dokumente_2012/2013/VENRO_Handreichung_Empfehlungen_Interaktion_080413.pdf, 8.4.2013.
