by Wolfgang Richter
On 1 January 2016, Germany assumed the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In times of crisis, the Federal Republic thus has a special role to play in the peaceful transformation of conflicts and securing Europe's stability.
With its OSCE Chairmanship in 2016, Germany has taken on further responsibility for the European security order in its most serious crisis since the end of the Cold War. Having already made a significant contribution to the Minsk agreements in the "Normandy format" - a quadripartite group consisting of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany - it is now also leading the organization that is monitoring the ceasefire in Donbas and driving forward the implementation of political and military agreements.
Current security challenges
Beyond conflict management in Ukraine, the OSCE Chairmanship must also focus its attention on the other unresolved territorial conflicts, particularly in Nagorno-Karabakh, in order to prevent further escalation. Above all, it will be important to prevent Europe from relapsing into a permanent politico-military confrontation, which would entail incalculable risks for the continent and the world. The OSCE, which has long been marginalized, is particularly suitable for this purpose because it is the only inclusive dialogue platform in Europe and has a unique acquis - the "OSCE acquis" - that combines agreements on comprehensive security cooperation with common norms and standards. Precisely because Europe has moved further and further away from this, the German OSCE Chairmanship has once again put this on the agenda under the motto: "Renewing dialog, rebuilding trust, restoring security." A look at the following contradictory strategic trends and security challenges illustrates the scale of this ambitious undertaking:
1. while the military situation in eastern Ukraine has calmed considerably in the second half of 2015, the prospects for implementing the political provisions of the Minsk agreements are darkening. Although Russia has apparently lost interest in the "New Russia" project, it will not drop the de facto regimes in Donetsk and Lugansk, but will insist on the agreed special status of these territories. However, the necessary changes to the Ukrainian constitution are unlikely to be implemented in the short term given the government crisis in Kiev and the resistance in parliament. Instead, Kiev wants to achieve a different sequence of provisions, i.e. first regaining full Ukrainian control over the border with Russia, replacing the rebel units with an international police mission and free elections in accordance with Ukrainian law under the supervision of the OSCE.
2) Even if the Minsk II agreements were fully implemented, the Crimean annexation would still stand in the way of a comprehensive rapprochement between the West and Russia. There are currently no signs of a solution in line with international law. It would require direct coordination between Moscow and Kiev and would have to be embedded in a comprehensive reconciliation of interests between NATO and Russia.
3) In Syria, the global convergence of interests between Russia and the USA and Western allies in the fight against terrorism contrasts with regional conflicts of interest, particularly between Russia and NATO member Turkey and between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although a negotiation process has been initiated which, for the first time in five years of civil war, offers the prospect of peace, external military support for the warring parties continues unabated. It therefore remains questionable to what extent common strategic interests will promote global cooperation and what repercussions this could have on Europe's security situation.
4 Although this strategic mix also opens up opportunities, NATO-Russia relations are deteriorating noticeably. In September 2014 in Wales, the Alliance responded to the threat fears of its eastern members with a military reassurance strategy. In July of this year, it will decide in Warsaw what further measures will be taken to improve the rapid military response capability and establish a permanent presence on the Alliance's eastern borders. This raises the question of whether the reciprocal obligations from the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 to not permanently station any additional substantial combat troops after NATO enlargement will still be met. Should this be answered in the negative, a deployment race in North-East Europe could ensue. The establishment of a military-political confrontation line through the whole of Eastern Europe would then not be an unlikely scenario. This would divide Europe once again. Countries with unresolved territorial conflicts, above all Ukraine, would be particularly affected.
Demands on the German OSCE Chairmanship
In order to prevent Europe from relapsing into a permanent confrontation, the OSCE Chairmanship will have to go beyond conflict management in Ukraine and the Caucasus and appeal to the responsibility of the participating states and press for compliance with and further development of existing OSCE commitments. They aim to create an undivided area of cooperative and equal security from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This aspiration made it possible to overcome the Cold War. Today, too, the comparative advantages of the OSCE should be used to build bridges between East and West.
The OSCE can draw on permanent dialog structures, an extensive body of joint decisions on a comprehensive approach to security, a comprehensive field presence and a wealth of experience in conflict management. Its pan-European inclusivity ensures the equal participation of all 57 OSCE states on an equal footing, including Russia. Although it is often difficult to reach the necessary consensus, joint decisions carry great weight. For example, the special monitoring mission in Ukraine was agreed jointly with Moscow and Kiev.
In order to initiate a turnaround in the tense security situation in Europe, a broad-based dialog on all security issues that have caused or promoted the crisis is necessary. The narratives in East and West have completely diverged on this. They concern deficits in the implementation of the OSCE basic documents on the strategic reconciliation of interests and the agreed norms and standards, existing threat perceptions and military doctrines, the adaptation of conventional arms control and military confidence building, questions of international law and the strengthening of the political weight and legal nature of the OSCE as a joint umbrella organization.
The revitalization of conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) is particularly important in the current situation. The rapid increase in overflights close to borders, military exercises and naval maneuvers by NATO and Russia since 2014 has exacerbated existing risk perceptions. It harbors a high potential for escalation. This should be countered not only by increasing the transparency of military activities, but also by reciprocal military restraint, especially near borders. In order to increase the transparency of military activities, the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures would have to be adapted. In particular, the categories of reportable armed forces should be expanded, the thresholds for maneuver observations lowered and the quotas for inspections as well as the number of inspectors and the duration of their stay on site increased.
Conventional arms control should be revived to reciprocally limit military activities and deployments. The bipolar limitation concept of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (CFE Treaty) negotiated during the Cold War is conceptually outdated and the treaty itself politically obsolete. The Adaptation Agreement of 1999 has not entered into force. Russia therefore suspended the CFE Treaty at the end of 2007. Since then, attempts to revive conventional arms control have failed, primarily because they were linked to issues of unresolved territorial conflicts. Today, it is missing in the crisis as the most effective instrument for ensuring stability.
Russia is unwilling to agree to a substantial adaptation of the Vienna Document as long as NATO is not prepared to make a concrete proposal for the renewal of conventional arms control. So far, it has merely called for more transparency in (Russian) military activities and for the Vienna Document to be adapted accordingly.
In view of these diverging interests, the OSCE Chairmanship has only limited room for maneuver. Only the Vienna Document is part of the common acquis of the OSCE participating states. For the renewal of conventional arms control, the key lies with NATO. The signal from the Warsaw Summit in July 2016 will also be of great importance in this regard. The partners should understand that the OSCE Chairmanship cannot only implement alliance policy, but is also committed to the stability of Europe as a whole.
