By Evgeniya Gataulina

With the increasing popularity of conservative ideas, international child rights norms are coming under criticism. The juxtaposition of children's rights and parental rights is a common argument that can be heard in both liberal democracies and authoritarian states. While in Germany public appearances against children's rights remain isolated and without political consequences, children's rights opponents in Russia have succeeded in stopping the passing of several progressive laws. What is behind their demands? And what can be done to counter the discrediting of children's rights?

Rejection despite recognition

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) of 1989 is the only UN human rights treaty that all states in the world - with the exception of the USA - have ratified. According to the spiral model of human rights change[1], children's rights norms should initially be given prescriptive status after ratification in the respective state. In practice, this means on the one hand that national legislation is brought into line with international standards. Secondly, the recognition of the validity of the standards in administrative and bureaucratic discourse is also part of the subsequent implementation steps. In the final spiral curve, the gap between rhetoric and actual practice narrows further. Both national governments and law enforcers such as administrative authorities now align their behavior with the new norms, so that systematic violations of children's rights no longer occur (cf. Risse/Jetschke/Schmitz 2002: 43; Heller 2008: 50).

Formally recognized, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child has nevertheless become the subject of increasing public criticism in certain conservative circles in recent years. By distancing themselves from 'Western ideas', more and more states are presenting themselves as protagonists of 'traditional values' that are supposedly incompatible with international human rights standards (cf. Stachursky 2013; von Heusinger 2015). Restrictive operating conditions - so-called shrinking spaces - for foreign-funded human rights and children's rights-oriented non-governmental organizations are a direct consequence of this isolationist approach. The introduction of restrictive NGO legislation is currently not only taking place in authoritarian states such as Russia, Turkey and Egypt, but is also part of national policy in the EU states of Hungary and Romania (see Toksabay/Sezer 2016; Terre des hommes 2017; Human Rights Watch 2017).

From the point of view of critics, children's rights and their advocates jeopardize the conventional image of the family and the traditional division of roles between men and women and between children and their parents. Even in liberal democracies, conservative political and civil society actors use this argument when they play off children's rights against parental rights. Conservative opponents do not understand parental rights as "a duty-bound, fiduciary right [...] that finds its limits in the best interests of the child" (Maywald 2016: 1340). Rather, they emphasize the unrestricted rights of parents over their children, who are perceived exclusively as objects of parental upbringing - and not as subjects with rights of their own. Corporal punishment is one of the natural, traditional methods of upbringing.

Appeals to protect the family as a unit against the individualized human rights of its members form the basis for numerous pro-family NGOs. For example, the US-based NGO "Family Watch International" protests against all family forms that deviate from marriage between a man and a woman and criticizes the "human rights language" and the "hidden agenda" of the United Nations (see Huffington Post 2011). Under the guise of child and family protection, it represents "xenophobic, misogynistic, homophobic, racist or nationalist views" and contributes to the perpetuation of discrimination against women and children, criticizes the international advocacy network Child Rights Information Network this NGO (CRIN 2017). In Germany, for example, AfD politician Beatrix von Storch publicly opposes children's rights by posting tweets such as: "Children HAVE rights because they are human beings. But anyone who calls for extra "children's rights" wants rights against parents. Therefore: NO to children's rights." While such statements appear to be marginal discourse in this country and cause a huge wave of outrage, anti-children's rights slogans enjoy broad public support in some other countries. Using Russia as an example, the following section shows how an anti-children's rights movement emerges and what influence it can have on the political decision-making process. The analysis is based on expert interviews with representatives of Russian child rights-oriented NGOs, which were conducted as part of field research in the first half of 2014.

Anti-juvenile movement in Russia as a new "civil society" force

After a decade of democratic reform attempts in the 1990s, a conservative turnaround has taken place since the beginning of Vladimir Putin's term of office in 2000 (see Bluhm 2017). In the Kremlin's political language, Western-influenced terms such as liberal democracy, open society and even human rights have gradually become "damaged goods" (Pomerantsev 2012). Instead, stability, order, traditional values and patriotism have become the new slogans of official discourse. State propaganda mixes anti-Western and anti-liberal ideas, homophobia, paedophilia and anti-Americanism in one pot and denounces the immorality of the West (cf. Gudkov/Rogov 2014).

As part of this conservative shift, a new trend has emerged in the Russian civil society community. According to child rights activists interviewed, this is a "new insane power", aggressive "chain dogs" or even "creepy fanatics" led by "dark group leaders" who are committed to "preserving the patriarchal foundations of the family" and enjoy massive support both among the population and in the Kremlin itself. As these conservative, anti-Western organizations position themselves as opponents of juvenile justice , they describe themselves as an anti-juvenile movement. In summary, they see themselves as a patriotic, anti-Western, conservative, Christian orthodox movement for the protection of traditional family values.

In addition to the "demonization" of the West, criticism of state guardianship and care authorities forms the ideological basis of the anti-juvenile movement. These authorities, which are reminiscent of German youth welfare offices, have a bad reputation due to their arbitrary methods, especially because they have long used the withdrawal of custody as their main means of dealing with families in crisis situations. The leaders of the conservative movement combined anti-Western rhetoric with fear of the guardianship authorities. As a result, they frowned upon any interference in internal family affairs as 'juvenile justice'. Detached or decoupled from its original meaning, "juvenile justice" became a catch-all term that its opponents filled with new content and equated with the questioning of parental authority. In their view, Western states use children's rights as a cover to destroy families. Children's rights are therefore unacceptable for Russia.

Advocacy campaigns against children's rights

The turning point of the anti-juvenile campaign took place in 2011-2012, when Sergei Kurginyan, the founder of the movement "The Essence of Time", organized counter-demonstrations to mass protests against the rigged Duma elections[2]. Kurginyan is known as a staunch defender of the Soviet legacy, who has "no official [political] position" but whose views are "very close to the ideological position of the Kremlin" (Schmid 2015: 110). While Kurginyan described the first rallies as "anti-orange" (alluding to the orange revolution in Ukraine) and actively campaigned for Putin, his rhetoric changed in May 2012, when he protested for the first time against the introduction of juvenile justice norms. In doing so, he launched a targeted discrediting campaign against two draft laws that were being discussed in the Russian parliament at the time. Specifically, these were the law on social patronage and the law on public control in state orphanages.

According to the "Essence of Time" movement, these laws threatened to destroy traditional family values in Russia. In fact, they aimed to support families in crisis situations on the one hand and to uphold children's rights in state boarding schools on the other. Both bills were the result of many years of lobbying efforts by Russian children's rights NGOs and were in line with both international standards and the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. As part of the anti-juvenile campaign, "The Essence of Time" organized demonstrations, protest posts and conferences in several Russian cities and collected over 200,000 signatures against the above-mentioned bills. According to a member of the Social Chamber, Duma deputies - although they initially supported these laws - "got scared because these people started besieging them, sending them petitions, organizing rallies and processions against all this" (Interview A, 29.05.2014). Even President Putin, who recommended to the State Duma on December 28, 2012 that both laws be drafted as a priority, changed his mind shortly afterwards. In the end, the Duma rejected both bills.

The media-resonant signature campaigns resulted in the founding of the movement "All-Russian Parents' Resistance" on 9 February 2013. Since anti-juvenile rhetoric has proven to be a highly effective mobilization tool, Kurginyan used the favourable moment to found a sister organization of his own movement "Essence of Time", at the head of which he appointed his wife - Maria Mamikonyan. Perhaps a 'parents' movement' seemed to him to be a better format for reaching people far removed from politics who did not feel addressed by the highly politicized demands of the "Essence of Time". With his fear-mongering warnings about the danger to Russian families and children[3], Kurginyan has found a way to mobilize more people to his cause. One child rights activist finds the position of President Vladimir Putin, who visited this "chic, this Sabbath of half-sick, marginalized people" and thus "assured them: 'Guys, I'm with you'" (Interview B, 19.06.2014), astonishing.

One of the most striking lobbying activities of the "All-Russian Parent Resistance" was the campaign against the comprehensive legislative package that was to ban physical violence in families. Their main argument against the "popoclatch law", as they trivialized it, is the claim that the ban on violence is part of a massive campaign against Russian families and that the vast majority of Russians do not condemn 'mild forms of violence'. Leading figures in the Russian Orthodox Church also voiced their criticism of the law, saying it "endangered Russian families" (Johnson 2017: 2). The conservative movement ultimately counted it as a success that a new law was passed in January 2017, which "downgraded violence in the family from a criminal offence to an administrative offence" and thus decriminalized it (Kosterina 2017: 4).

The anti-juvenile movement demonstrates its growing influence through mass advocacy campaigns against child rights-oriented policies. Its obvious aim is to maintain traditional power relations based on discrimination in the private and public sphere and to discredit the idea of children's rights. For example, one movement supporter suggested to the first children's rights ombudsman, Alexei Golovan, that Russia should withdraw from the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In return, she promised him "a monument" (Interview B, 19.06.2014).

Support despite contradictions

Despite multiple contradictions and the inconsistent arguments of the anti-juvenile organizations, they have hundreds of thousands of sympathizers in Russian society. The NGO experts interviewed see two main reasons for this. Firstly, anti-Western hysteria and zealous patriotism form an essential part of the official isolationist course. Obedient figures such as Kurginyan and Mamikonyan can therefore count on the support of the state, be it in the form of financial contributions or open approval. Influential figures from politics, the judiciary and religion, such as the Chairman of the Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin, are increasingly appearing at anti-juvenile events and criticizing the West for "interfering (...) in perfectly happy families" (RBK 2016). On the other hand, the NGOs surveyed see people's "ignorance" as another reason for their popularity, especially among believers, who easily become victims of manipulation. As a counter-strategy, the NGO activists consider it necessary to uncover and publicly name the internal contradictions and hidden goals of the anti-juvenile movement and to articulate the reform ideas in a fact-based and practical manner. In other words, child rights-oriented values and norms need local advocates who link local grievances with the global child rights discourse and develop an alternative discourse to anti-Western rhetoric.

Conclusion

Playing off children's rights against parental rights and equating children's rights with state interference in private family matters are the most common arguments put forward by conservative opponents of children's rights. Rather, the UNCRC attempts to strike a delicate balance between the child's right to a family and the primary role of family integrity on the one hand, and the best interests of the child on the other. The Convention emphasizes that the family is the most desirable and suitable environment for the child (Preamble). It obliges States Parties to take all possible measures to support the family and prevent its collapse (Art. 18, 27). At the same time, the child acts as an autonomous legal entity who - to put it bluntly - is not the property of their parents and must therefore also be protected from abuse and neglect in the family context (see Schapper 2014; Holzscheiter 2010; Cantwell/Holzscheiter 2008).

Anti-child rights statements and campaigns are common for conservative actors who want to counteract social and political change. As the examples mentioned above show, the questioning of children's rights takes place in authoritarian states, but also to some extent in liberal democracies. In my view, the most effective way to counter this phenomenon is to link children's rights to local problems and to demonstrate their usefulness for solving problems in specific areas. Civil society and public organizations have a special role to play here as localizers or translators of norms. Through their concrete, daily work - be it with individual cases or in combating systemic abuses - they can bring children's rights "to life". In many conversations with employees of German and Russian civil society organizations that work directly with children and families, I found that they are usually aware of the existence of children's rights norms, but often do not see them as guiding their work. In order to change this, these organizations must of course first deal with children's rights issues themselves, e.g. as part of further training, exchange programmes or conferences. Future educational, medical and other professionals should already come into contact with children's rights during their studies and think about their applicability in their research group. Examples of this include the part-time Master's course in Child Protection at the Alice Salomon University of Applied Sciences and the Master's program in Childhood Studies and Children's Rights at the University of Potsdam. Apart from sporadic seminars on children's rights issues, this kind of debate is otherwise rare at German universities. Events such as the Children's Rights Film Festival in Berlin and Brandenburg offer a wonderful opportunity for educational professionals and anyone interested to approach this topic from a new angle - from the perspective of the children themselves (see Bachner 2017). If there is a broad understanding in society of what children's rights mean and can achieve on a large and small scale, statements and appeals that are hostile to children's rights have no chance.

[1] The five successive phases run from (1) Repression, (2) Denial and (3) Tactical concessions to (4) Prescriptive status and (5) Norm-guided behavior (Risse/Ropp/Sikkink 1999, Risse/Jetschke/Schmitz 2002: 31-45, Risse/Ropp/Sikkink 2013: 5-22).

[2] After the so-called castling on September 24, 2011, when the then Kremlin leader Dmitry Medvedev proposed Vladimir Putin as a candidate for the 2012 presidential election in order to 'replace' him as head of government, critical voices grew among the population (cf. Lenta 2011). The obviously manipulated and falsified Duma elections on December 4, 2011 served as a trigger for the largest protest actions since the collapse of the Soviet Union (cf. Lipman 2012).

[3] In an interview with the First Channel, Kurginyan claimed that "in the West" children are separated from their families if the mother "loves her children too much" or if the parents warn their child to wash their hands before eating (Pervij Kanal 2012).