by Gregor Hofmann

Four years after the intervention in Libya, the international (state) community is in danger of failing in its responsibility to prevent further bloodshed.

In 2011, the Security Council mandated a military intervention in Libya; for the first time in the history of the United Nations, this was done with reference to the so-called responsibility to protect. Against the will of an incumbent government, the UN Security Council mandated the intervention on the grounds that it had to protect the local civilian population. This was initially celebrated by many as a success for the so-called Responsibility to Protect. The international community took on this responsibility to protect the population from the worst atrocities, as the Libyan state had shown no consideration in its actions against the opposition. But four years later, disillusionment is spreading: De facto civil war is raging in Libya. In view of the escalating situation, the international community now once again has a duty to fulfill its responsibility to prevent new atrocities in Libya. For today, Libya is at a point where the growing violence is not only escalating into a new civil war, but could also escalate into a large-scale campaign of revenge, from which the civilian population in particular would once again suffer. If the concept of the responsibility to protect is to continue to be taken seriously, the international community has a duty to prevent such a development.

Prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation as part of the responsibility to protect

As a result of the air strikes against the regime of Muamar al-Gaddafi carried out by the USA, France, Great Britain, other NATO states and their Arab allies in 2011, the Libyan opposition was able to topple the old regime within six months. Despite international criticism of the forced regime change, many commentators saw the events as a success; for the norm of the responsibility to protect and, incidentally, for the democratization of North Africa.

But strictly speaking, the international (state) community failed to fulfill its full responsibility in Libya: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is to be understood as a political commitment by the international community to three intertwined responsibilities, or "postulates", unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005: every state has a responsibility to protect its population from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing (Pillar 1). In addition, the international community has a responsibility to support individual states in fulfilling their responsibilities (Pillar 2). If a state fails or is unwilling to fulfill its responsibility, the responsibility is transferred to the international community. Ultimately, the UN Security Council is then ready to respond with coercive measures, including the use of military force (pillar 3).

However, the group of experts that originally formulated the idea of R2P in 2001 called for a responsibility to rebuild(peacebuilding, post-conflict rehabilitation) in addition to the responsibilities to prevent and respond: After an intervention or after the end of serious atrocities, the international community must support the affected state in order to prevent a relapse. Even if the R2P adopted by the UN in 2005 differs greatly in some points from the original version of 2001, post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction is still a component of international responsibility and is subsumed under the second pillar of the R2P. In the words of Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon: "Peacebuilding after a traumatic situation is a crucial phase for the provision of assistance in the area of the responsibility to protect".

Failure of prevention in Libya after 2011

After the revolution, the opposition quickly split into many small militias organized along tribal, regional or religious lines. As a result of the failure to disarm after the fall of Gaddafi, weapons were available in almost unlimited quantities. This made it difficult to establish a state monopoly on the use of force. The government that took office following the elections in July 2012 was even dependent on the various militias to maintain security. A UN support mission stationed in the country, UNSMIL, is active in Libya with just over 200 civilian staff, but an armed UN peacekeeping mission to secure the transition phase was never seriously discussed.

Looking at the risk of serious atrocities in Libya, such as crimes against humanity or war crimes, it is clear that many of the risk factors for the occurrence of such crimes are currently present. The UN has developed an analytical framework for assessing the risk of atrocities. However, the existence of the named factors does not automatically lead to atrocities. Atrocities can also occur without all the factors being present. Nevertheless, the analytical framework provides a tool for assessing the seriousness of a situation. It consists of eight general risk factors and six specific factors for certain atrocities.

Early Warning Analysis Framework of the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the International Responsibility to Protect

General risk factors

1. Armed conflict or other forms of instability
2. Serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
3. Weak state structures
4. Existence of incentives or motives for serious atrocities
5. Capabilities to commit grave atrocities
6. Absence of mitigating factors
7. Existence of enabling circumstances or preparatory measures
8. Presence of potentially triggering factors

Specific risk factors

Genocide

1. Tensions between groups or discrimination against members of a particular population group
2. Indications of intent to destroy a specific population group in whole or in part

Crimes against humanity

1. Indications of widespread or systematic attacks against civilian populations
2. Indications of a plan to attack the civilian population

War crimes

1. Serious threats against persons and groups protected under international humanitarian law
2. Serious threats against humanitarian aid operations or peacekeeping missions

Instability and weak state structures

The situation in Libya escalated in spring 2014. As in Syria, extreme Islamist groups were able to use the instability in the country to gain a foothold. Islamist militias had already played an important role in the resistance against Gaddafi, but after his overthrow, radical Islamist militias such as Ansar al-Sharia were able to take control of entire cities. Weapons depots and training bases were set up in the east of the country in particular, around Benghazi and Sirte, also to train fighters for the battle in Syria.

General Khalifa Haftar, who fell out with Gaddafi at the end of the 1980s and had been trying to overthrow him ever since, launched the so-called "Operation Dignity" on May 16, an offensive against Islamist militias that continues to this day. Many will still have the images of the burning airport in their minds. Haftar controls large troop units in his "Libyan National Army".

After the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and its allied militias from Misrata lost the election to the transitional parliament they had previously dominated in June 2014, a second line of conflict opened up. The election losers did not recognize the result, withdrew from the new parliament and in July 2014 launched their own offensive, known as the "Libyan Dawn", with the aim of gaining control of the national territory. They quickly captured the capital Tripoli. There they proclaimed a counter-government, which attempted to legitimize itself through the remnants of the voted-out transitional parliament. The remaining members of parliament fled with the transitional government to a hotel in the eastern Libyan city of Tobruk. Islamist groups in eastern Libya are also associated with Operation Libyan Dawn, although they have distanced themselves from Ansar al-Sharia and other extremists.

Libya today is a very fragile state, with two competing governments and numerous militias controlling smaller areas. This is also reflected in relevant indices, such as the Libya is not far away from a state collapse according to its standards. The higher the score (between 0 and 120) that a state receives in this index, the more unstable it is. The index does not yet officially classify Libya as a failed state - like South Sudan, Somalia or the Central African Republic. However, the trend points to a worsening development and the latest events are not even included in the data.

Tensions between different population groups

The situation in Libya is very confusing. Different militias are fighting each other. In addition to the Muslim Brotherhood and the militias in Tripoli and Misrata, many of whom see themselves as moderate Islamists, radical Islamist organizations such as Ansar al-Sharia are also strong. In addition, a branch of the Islamic State (ISIS) also formed in Libya in the fall of 2014. The Muslim Brotherhood and its allies, who de facto control the state and security forces in the west of the country, are also taking action against Islamist terrorists in Tripoli.

The parliament in Tobruk in eastern Libya, on the other hand, supports General Haftar's "Libyan National Army", which is said to have dubious democratic aims at best. The actual Libyan army, on the other hand, plays a subordinate role. Haftar and the Libyan transitional government are also supported by other militias, which are, however, also pursuing their own goals. Threatened by the Islamists, moderate and liberal politicians see themselves forced to side with former supporters of Gaddafi, who can well imagine Haftar as the new strongman in Libya.

However, the conflict should not be understood as one-dimensionally religiously motivated: It only appears to be exclusively about a fight between secularists and Islamists. The conflict reveals the country's deep-rooted regional divisions: The economically strong and oil-rich east of the country has long seen itself exploited by the west, where the majority of the population lives. The population is increasingly divided according to their regional origin. Those who live in the east of the country and have roots in the west are increasingly forced to migrate and become internally displaced persons. Mistrust is growing.

While Haftar sees himself as the last bulwark against Islamist terrorism, the Muslim Brotherhood and its allied militias justify their actions by wanting to protect Libya from a return of Gaddafi supporters. The respective opponent seems to be increasingly seen as an evil to be destroyed.

Violation of human rights, international humanitarian law and attacks on the civilian population

So far, both sides have shown little consideration in their actions. Bombardments of civilian areas and other violations of international humanitarian law are not uncommon in Libya. Amnesty International presented a report in which the organization accuses both sides of attacking civilians on the basis of their affiliation to political camps. The UNSMIL mission and the UN Human Rights Office also speak of war crimes and targeted abductions of people on the basis of their religious, tribal or family affiliation. There are also reports of the kidnapping of Egyptian Coptic Christians by Ansar al-Sharia and attacks against other ethnic minorities in the country.

Absence of conflict-mitigating factors and circumstances conducive to existence

A culture of violence and impunity prevails in the country. No one is held accountable for violations of international humanitarian law. Although the Security Council has emphasized that the International Criminal Court is also investigating the current events and has extended the existing sanctions, this does not seem to have done much to mitigate the conflict dynamics. Of the three cases opened so far, only one, against Gaddafi's son Saif, is being continued. However, this has so far failed due to a lack of cooperation on the ground.

The parliament in Tobruk does not appear to be able to control the army under Haftar's leadership or prevent it from committing atrocities. The hardliners in the transitional parliament in Tobruk also do not appear to be interested in peace negotiations. Instead, they are seeking a military solution to the conflict. The Muslim Brotherhood also see themselves as potential victors in a military conflict. Both sides can hope for external support: General Haftar, the parliament in Tobruk and allied militias (Operation Dignity) are receiving help from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. The Muslim Brotherhood and allied militias (Operation Libyan Dawn), on the other hand, find favor in Qatar, Sudan and Turkey.

Ansar al-Sharia and militias close to the Islamic State receive support from other allied terrorist organizations in North Africa and the Middle East. Their goal is not Libya itself, but to control or at least influence the entire region. Peace in Libya would therefore do more harm than good to their goals - after all, they benefit from the weakness of the state.

Existence of motives and capabilities for serious atrocities

The UN's mediation efforts are therefore only making slow progress. The ceasefire agreed in mid-January 2015 is fragile. For a long time, none of the parties to the conflict were prepared to sit down at the negotiating table. Negotiations are currently taking place in Geneva between most of the armed factions. Representatives of Libyan Dawn announced at the end of January that they would take part in the negotiations if they were held in Libya. However, the initial situation is problematic: as the international community only recognizes the government in Tobruk as legitimate, the Islamists have little incentive to avoid a military conflict. A military victory could at least give them de facto sole rule. On the other hand, General Haftar does not seem willing to make any concessions to the Islamists, which is reflected in his failure to distinguish between Muslim Brothers and terrorists. According to human rights organizations, both sides are already targeting civilian supporters of the other side. In the event of a further escalation of violence, these attacks could quickly escalate into systematic persecution - Syria, South Sudan and the Central African Republic are tragic current examples of this.

All already lost? How can the international community still take preventive or peace-building action in Libya?

A solution to the conflict in Libya is not only morally right, but would also serve the fundamental security interests of Western democracies: Libya's destabilizing effect on its regional neighbourhood could already be observed in Mali in 2012. The presence of ISIS and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya also shows once again how quickly unstable states can become a safe haven for terrorists and jihadists.

It does not yet seem too late to prevent worse things from happening in Libya. The Libyan population appears to be opposed to armed conflict and supports the various militias primarily for reasons of security in the immediate private sphere. The British ambassador to Libya also expressed cautious optimism about the progress of the negotiations on Twitter at the end of January.

The UN's mediation efforts in Geneva must be flanked by serious diplomatic engagement from external powers. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar and Sudan must cease their support for both sides of the conflict. At least on the first four, the USA and the West have an influence that should not be underestimated and should be used. The arms embargo on Libya that has been in place since 2011 must also be enforced more effectively. The transitional government should also no longer receive weapons.

In addition, the climate of impunity in Libya must be ended in order to deter the parties to the conflict from committing further atrocities. Amnesty International and the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect are calling on the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court to investigate those responsible for atrocities. The Security Council should also extend the existing sanctions in a more targeted manner to those responsible and restrict their freedom of movement abroad and their ability to participate in international payments.

Another option could be to condition international recognition for the transitional government in Tobruk if it does not engage in peace negotiations. Libya's financial resources held abroad could also be frozen and only released once a peace agreement has been concluded.

The transformation of existing conflict dynamics in Libya and thus the prevention of possible serious atrocities can only be achieved through negotiations and a government of national unity, in which both major camps must be involved. A comprehensive peace agreement must include plans for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the fighters. In order to prevent future tensions, mechanisms for dealing with what has happened and punishing those responsible must also be part of a peace agreement.

Only when such an agreement exists and is signed in Libya would it make sense to deploy UN peacekeepers to monitor the implementation of the agreed measures and protect civilians in the event of a renewed escalation. However, without a peace plan to protect and without the consent of the conflict parties to a blue helmet mission, renewed military intervention in Libya would achieve nothing.

The international community therefore has both a moral and a strategic obligation to finally fulfill its responsibility for prevention.

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