On June 16, Jürgen Wagner described PESCO as a "military aberration" in an article on the Peace Academy blog - A reply.

By Sebastian Graf von Kielmansegg

When the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was launched in 1998/99, it was probably the Union's most spectacular policy area for some time. After the completion of monetary union, it was seen as the next major integration project. However, the dynamic years of development were followed by inevitable disillusionment; further development remained cumbersome and modest in the day-to-day running of Brussels politics. Now the "Permanent Structured Cooperation" - or PESCO - is the new ominous magic formula that is the focus of attention. Established by the EU Council in December 2017, it is intended to give new impetus to European defense policy.

Experts are rightly skeptical as to whether PESCO can meet these expectations. For the time being, it is still an unclear entity whose design leaves many questions unanswered. In principle, however, most observers see it as an overdue step in the right direction. However, PESCO has also been criticized in principle. These voices include Jürgen Wagner 's blog post from June 16, 2018, which describes PESCO as a a "military aberration" . He cites two main points of criticism: the establishment of a special regime under Franco-German dominance and - above all - a further "militarization" of the EU. This judgment calls for a response.

A building block in a multi-speed Europe

It is true that PESCO is a specific version of the idea of a "core Europe" or "multi-speed Europe" - the remnant of the more ambitious "defense union" project that accompanied the 2004 European Constitutional Treaty and was in the tradition of European monetary union. These concepts were always highly controversial, and this is one of the reasons why the member states were so hesitant to initiate PESCO. It is also true that the turnaround in 2017 was largely due to the initiative of France and Germany. However, this does not make PESCO a Franco-German condominium. The option to establish PESCO, which has now been exercised, was jointly enshrined by all member states in the Treaty of Lisbon. The rules provided for this in the EU Treaty were the result of a long negotiation process and ensure that PESCO is not an exclusive club. Every member state has the right to participate and the legal hurdles for this are kept as low and general as possible. Although the initial idea was once to bring together the militarily important EU Member States in PESCO, the requirements of the EU Treaty were ultimately so much less stringent that any EU Member State with an interest can fulfill them. It is no coincidence that 25 member states, including Cyprus, are now involved in the starting shot. Only the UK (which is leaving the EU anyway with BREXIT), Denmark (which has always not participated in EU defense policy) and Malta (which only has a very small armed forces) have refused to participate. An integration project cannot be much more inclusive.

Legalization and formalization

The internal structure of PESCO can also in no way be characterized as a "hierarchically structured military power" that "replaces consensus with coercion and presses the member states into an arms corset with tangible threats of sanctions". It is a characteristic of PESCO that it strives for a certain degree of legalization and formalization. Arms and defense policy agreements and commitments that were previously of a purely political nature are given a legally binding character within the framework of PESCO. However, this only takes on a characteristic feature that also characterizes the entire CFSP (and European integration as such): the attempt to achieve coordinated action through legally binding decisions. There may be doubts as to whether this legal obligation will have much impact in reality - but this principle can hardly be seen as an undue constraint.

The treaty requires unanimity for decisions within PESCO. Participation in individual projects within PESCO therefore remains a sovereign decision of each participating member state. And the general basic obligations that each participating state has recognized leave so much leeway when viewed in the light of day - and very deliberately - that clear violations are easy to avoid. Germany, which is known not to be in a good position in terms of many arms policy parameters, had to have an interest in this. For example, the member states commit to regular increases in the defense budget, but wisely without specifying concrete rates of increase, a target quota or specific time periods. Ultimately, PESCO is based less on legal obligations, let alone sanctions, than on the expectation that the new system can increase the political will to comply.

Coordination of force structures

And finally: What is the point of the criticism of the "militarization" of the EU all about? Anyone who rejects military action in principle and sees it as "useless in terms of peace policy" will naturally also reject efforts to improve military capabilities. From this perspective, the development of EU defense policy since 1999, i.e. the departure from the old model of the EU as a purely civilian power, was the real fall from grace. However, if one does not follow this very general and simple premise, things turn out differently. First of all, it must be made clear that PESCO is not concerned with defense policy as a whole, but only with one particular facet: the further development of the military capabilities of the member states. The conduct of EU military operations, on the other hand, remains - as before - a matter for the EU as a whole. The provisions of the EU Treaty are very clear on this point. Secondly, it is undisputed among experts that there is an urgent need for action with regard to the military capabilities of Europeans. The European armed forces have serious deficits and capability gaps. The uncoordinated coexistence of 28 national armed forces, each with their own equipment and armaments projects, is highly inefficient. If this situation is to improve, it is essential not only to strengthen armaments investments and force structures, but above all to coordinate them more intelligently. This is precisely the aim and thrust of PESCO.

PESCO is therefore an instrument for Europeanizing force structures and armaments policy to a certain extent. This is neither an aberration nor a militarization of Europe, but a sensible and measured attempt to pool the defence policy resources of Europeans. It remains to be seen whether the impetus provided by PESCO is really sufficient for such a turnaround.