By Timo Duile

Long celebrated as a prime example of the compatibility of democracy, pluralism and Islam, tensions between religious groups in Indonesia have intensified, particularly in recent years. Mass demonstrations against the Christian governor of Jakarta at the end of 2016 were a temporary highlight, as he had long been a thorn in the side of radical Islamic groups. However, the accusation of blasphemy has now mobilized hundreds of thousands of Muslims against him. Political demands from radical and conservative Islamic circles now seem to have become acceptable in the middle of society.

The old Javanese saying Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is the official national motto of Indonesia. It is often translated into English as "Unity in Diversity" and into Indonesian as "Berbeda-beda tetapi tetap satu" (different, but irrevocably one). This motto refers both to the extraordinary cultural diversity by European standards and to the endeavor to keep this diversity together and unite it in one nation. Around 250 different languages are spoken in Indonesia. There are hundreds of different ethnic groups in the country, which would stretch from Ireland to the Caspian Sea if its contours were laid over a map of Europe. Above all, however, the country strives to maintain its image as a country of religious pluralism and a harmonious multi-religious society, even if this image has been clearly torn in recent years. Six religions are officially recognized by the state: In addition to Islam, which according to official figures is professed by 87% of the approximately 250 million inhabitants, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism are also recognized by the state. In a recent ruling by the Constitutional Court, the state was also called upon to recognize indigenous religions, which in Indonesia are collectively referred to by the often negatively connoted term kepercayaaan.

Nevertheless, Indonesia is not a prime example of peaceful coexistence between religions. At the end of 2016, the largest demonstrations in the country's history took place in Jakarta. The people were not protesting against the still rampant corruption or the environmental pollution that costs thousands of lives every year. People also seem to have become accustomed to the widening social divide in the country, where around 100 million people are now considered poor or at risk of poverty (while the four richest Indonesians own as much as these 100 million poor people combined). Instead, the Christian governor of Jakarta aroused anger by saying that people need not vote for him if they would rather be lied to by those who claimed that a Koranic verse forbids Muslims from electing a non-Muslim to political office. Islamic hardliners promptly saw their chance and insinuated that the governor had claimed that the Quranic verse itself was a lie. Blatant blasphemy! Hundreds of thousands of people in white robes gathered in the streets of Jakarta. The previously very popular governor not only lost the election to his challenger, who had openly shown his support for violent Islamists from the Front Pembela Islam (Front of Defenders of Islam) during the election campaign, but was also sentenced to two years' imprisonment for blasphemy.

However, the governor's case is only one part of a rather gloomy overall picture. In the name of morality and religion, a number of ministers and clergymen had already railed against homosexuals and transsexuals at the beginning of 2016, although many Indonesian cultures traditionally recognize genders beyond man and woman. Not only politicians in Jakarta have now realized that religion is a good way to play politics. Especially in conservative areas, more and more Sharia-inspired laws have been passed for years, often to the chagrin of religious minorities and people who prefer a secular lifestyle. Women are particularly affected by these laws, as they have to adhere to dress codes, for example, or are not allowed to leave the house in the evening without being accompanied by a male relative or husband. On Indonesian television, even cartoon series such as Spongebob, Doraemon or Shaun the Sheep are now censored because, for example, a cartoon squirrel in a swimsuit appears to be suitable for corrupting the morals of young people. Whereas 20 years ago women often went out on the street without a headscarf, today Islamic clothing dominates even in the big cities. Clothing and everyday behavior have long since become an expression of a conservative-religious attitude to life, to which politics has attuned itself. A survey conducted by Lembarga Survei Indonesia at the end of2017 revealed that around half of all voters in Indonesia now believe that non-Muslims should not seek higher political office.

The conservative turn in politics and society - and not least in the religious institutions themselves - has taken place primarily since the end of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998. In 2005, the influential Council of Ulama of Indonesia(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), in which both the large, moderate organizations and radical groups are represented, issued an Islamic legal opinion(fatwa) that classified liberalism, pluralism and secularism as forbidden(haram). Above all, the classification of pluralism as haram in a country whose national motto is "unity in diversity" may come as a surprise. The fatwa was based on the view that the individual religions should not mix, but should each form self-contained social units: In the eyes of the ulama, a "pure" Islam should be preserved. According to this understanding, pluralism would lead to a contamination of the faith. This also explains why many conservative ulama consider it haram for Muslims to wish their Christian fellow citizens a Merry Christmas.

In the course of this conservative turn, contemporary society in Indonesia is rapidly developing back into what John Furnivall called the "plural society" of the Dutch East Indies in the 1930s. He associated this term with the diagnosis that people lived in different groups under one political unit, the colonial state. According to Furnivall, the individual groups differed in their language, their customary law(adat) and their religion and lived largely isolated from each other in everyday life. They only interact with each other in the marketplace, where they face each other as buyers, sellers and competitors. This interaction in the marketplace does not give rise to community-building solidarity or a common identity. If you look at Indonesia today, it seems as if the whole country is a huge marketplace, with everything from luxury malls in the big cities to roadside vendors selling everything. And society is now more fragmented than ever, especially along religious lines. The demonstrations against the Christian governor were just one manifestation of this social fragmentation: in Christian areas, sometimes thousands of kilometers away from the capital, there were numerous demonstrations and expressions of solidarity for the Christian governor. Certainly not without good reason, people felt that Islamic groups were now paving the way for non-Muslims to no longer play an important role in politics in future. Today, this is a massive challenge to the equality of Indonesian citizens - and it was not least this ideal of a more egalitarian society that drove many fighters for Indonesian independence.

The Indonesian independence movement - or at least large parts of it - can be interpreted as an attempt to leave behind the pluralistic, fragmented society of the colonial era and create a new, common national culture of unity. This effort was already expressed in the choice of Malay, a trade language spoken almost everywhere in the archipelago, as the Indonesian national language. Neither the hierarchical Javanese nor the language of another ethnic group, and certainly not Dutch, were considered as the language of the new nation. Choosing the comparatively egalitarian Malay trade language as the national language was an ingenious idea to create an Indonesian identity and unity.

Religion certainly played an important role in the process of searching for unity and national identity from the very beginning, which is also reflected in the first pillar of the Indonesian national philosophy Pancasila. According to this, the state is based on the concept of an all-one God(Kethuhanan yang Maha Esa), one could also say on monotheistic faith (and indeed all recognized religions in Indonesia are monotheistic in conception). However, socialist and communist ideas also played a central role in the creation of a common cultural identity during and in the years following the struggle for independence. Indonesia joined the Non-Aligned Movement, whose political culture is strongly characterized by egalitarian, democratic and populist content. Sukarno, the country's first president, tried to reconcile religious forces and communists. For him, being Indonesian was synonymous with being left-wing and religious.

However, after the bloody extermination of hundreds of thousands of communists by the army between 1965 and 1968, this process of searching for unity and Indonesian identity was radically overturned. The new government under Suharto, who ruled the country until the Asian economic crisis of 1998, focused on depoliticizing the masses. Thinking in clear hierarchies was once again in demand and all left-wing movements were demonized and banned. Being left-wing meant being communist, and in the propaganda of the Suharto regime this was synonymous with anti-religious, i.e. anti-state attitudes. Although political Islam was also initially suppressed under Suharto, Islam as a political identity has retained its legitimacy in the eyes of many Indonesians, in contrast to left-wing approaches. This alone explains why Islam is so influential today, not only as a social factor but also as a political force. However, this inevitably leads to social fragmentation in the multi-religious country and, in a sense, back to the pluralistic society of the late colonial era.

There are repeated reports pointing out that "secular" or "nationalist" parties are winning more votes than religious parties in the elections in the now democratic Indonesia. However, it must be argued that the division between these camps is not so clear-cut in Indonesia. Even at first glance, religion is an important factor in election campaigns and politics in more nationalist parties. When religiously inspired laws are passed, whether at regional or national level, many of the apparently secular parties are also involved because they do not want to be seen as less religious or even critical of religion.

Stronger religious movements also often refer positively to the idea of the Indonesian nation. However, their goal is a pluralistic society with Islamic-Sunni supremacy, expressed in the concept of the NKRI bersyariah (The Unitary State of Indonesia under Sharia Law). This idea also has a long tradition in Indonesia, but only now, in the wake of the conservative turn in society, is there a chance of gaining a considerable number of supporters for this idea. It is not surprising that Islamic and Islamist movements are primarily aimed at the approximately 100 million Indonesians who are still poor or threatened by poverty, as these people do not have a political alternative in the form of a left-wing party or movement. This leaves political Islam and identity politics as ideologies against social injustice and the ever-widening gap between rich and poor. Of course, Islamist groups do not offer a well-founded economic analysis, but mobilize resentment against supposedly rich or conspiring Christians or Indonesians of Chinese origin.

The current religious conflicts can perhaps be better understood in light of the historical overview outlined here. Ultimately, these disputes are also about determining what actually constitutes Indonesian identity and how the relationship between unity and diversity should be conceived within it. The national motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika leaves plenty of room for various interpretations. Everything is possible, from a pluralistic society under Sharia law to an inclusive society in which the individual groups maintain a critical but respectful relationship and different (religious) communities do not form monadic groups, but instead cultivate cultural exchange. Another important question is how the state and its institutions behave in this debate. If, as has happened again and again in recent years, Islamist groups, in collaboration with or at least with the approval of the police, incite hatred against religious minorities such as Shiites or Ahmadis, against lesbians and gays or the victims of anti-communist campaigns and martially demonstrate their willingness to use violence, then this seems to be a bad sign for the future. We can only hope that the people who strive for pluralism and mutual respect will not allow themselves to be completely intimidated by religious hardliners.