by Alexandra Gericke

The peace agreement signed in Colombia in 2016 is the talk of the town despite its rather sluggish implementation and many points of criticism. However, there can be no talk of "peace" as long as a small guerrilla group - the ELN - is still active. Why has this important part of the Colombian conflict faded into the background and seems to have been almost "forgotten" by the outside world? The complexity of this important sub-conflict and the role played by the ELN itself will be explained below.

The peace agreement between the Colombian government under President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC[1]) received considerable attention worldwide. With the agreement as a first step, it remains to be seen whether Colombia is actually on the road to peace after more than 50 years of conflict. At this point, it is particularly interesting to take a look at Colombia's last guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN[2]), whose background is often only superficially known to outsiders. This article is dedicated to the significance of this conflict actor with regard to the success of the Colombian peace process as a whole and examines the factors that are currently making it difficult to start peace talks.

Not all guerrillas are the same: special features of the ELN

While the FARC was founded in the mid-1960s as a response to the 'National Front'[3] from communist peasant associations and initially concentrated defensively on defending land ownership, the ELN was formed shortly afterwards in direct reference to the events of the Cuban Revolution. Its attitude (like that of the FARC) is anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. However, it also actively pursues the goal of disempowering the national oligarchy and armed forces, which support the economic, political and military interests of North American imperialism (Jäger et.al. 2007: 22). The group, often referred to as 'petro-guerrillas', fights (unlike the FARC) almost exclusively against multinational corporations, which are primarily active in the field of oil production and which it holds responsible for poverty, displacement, violence and exploitation. Their income is based on kidnappings and extortion of protection money and now also from links to drug trafficking[4] (ibid.: 80).

The main difference between the ELN[5], which is much smaller in number than the FARC, is its particularly strong ideological anchoring as an anti-state actor. As the population shares the ELN's fight against displacement and injustice at the hands of the state, the latter also has relatively greater social support than the FARC. Reports by independent organizations and the press show that the ELN appears comparatively less frequently: while the FARC had influence in practically the entire country with more than fifty guerrilla fronts, the ELN is only present in five strategic areas according to the military(La Vanguardia, 31.03.16, FIP, 2015: 8)[6]. Despite its small size, this has made it an important and not to be underestimated conflict actor in over five decades of armed conflict, which - just like the FARC - has been guilty of countless serious acts of violence against the civilian population[7].

The two oldest guerrilla groups in Colombia differ in their patterns of action and their basic attitudes. While the FARC, with a different type of organization, would ideally carry out their political struggle legally (as has been proven several times in the past), the ELN represents the extreme opposite pole to the state. Agreeing to a dialog would be tantamount to turning away from the anti-state ideology and therefore seems almost impossible.

Neglect of the ELN despite peace efforts since 1982

The Colombian state's failure to recognize this differentiation has led to decades of neglect - but not oblivion - of the ELN. Bogota's US-backed 'war on terror' was directed against a multitude of actors, one of which - completely undifferentiated - was 'the guerrillas'. The balance between the different guerrilla groups only changed with the peace agreement in 2016 and led to the ELN being reintegrated into the peace efforts. Only now did a rethink appear to have taken place, as President Santos repeatedly emphasized that 'complete peace' in Colombia could only be achieved if an agreement could also be reached with the ELN(EFE, 10.10.2016).

Since 1982, rapprochement with the ELN has proved particularly difficult compared to other groups, as this guerrilla group has never managed to gain sufficient trust from the government. Due to its deeply rooted anti-capitalist ideology, it always questioned the motives and goodwill behind the peace requests[8]. It was almost always the ELN, along with many other guerrilla groups, that spoke out most clearly against negotiations and instead focused on the goals of 'humanizing the war' (i.e. applying international humanitarian law to the armed conflict) and the policy of defending national resources (i.e. protecting Colombia from exploitation by multinational corporations) (Ramírez Tobón 1990: 269). Despite ideological differences, rapprochement came to a standstill time and again. The picture described above ran through the various presidencies: there were rapprochements and talks between the state and parts of the ELN. These were followed by rejections of the compromises proposed by the government by the guerrilla group, a strengthening of the rebels in the wake of kidnappings and ransom money from home and abroad, renewed attacks on oil pipelines and strongly hardened fronts at the end of all peace requests, from which the ELN usually emerged financially and militarily stronger (Villarraga 2013: 45).

It was not until the peace dynamics of the April 19 Movement (M-19[9]) and the results achieved in 1990[10] that members of the ELN began to seriously reconsider their positions. The advantages of a peace treaty were clearly demonstrated by the M-19 demobilization: former guerrillas were now able to help shape politics legally. They even formed a significant part of the constituent assembly of 1991. However, a fundamental change of direction within the second largest guerrilla group did not materialize. Once again, the discrepancy between their willingness to lay down their arms with the will to exert political influence and their clearly stated goals of fighting the oil industry - and the state cooperating with it - by all means is evident.

Since 1982 to date, only agreements and ceasefire declarations have been concluded with parts of the ELN, but these have never lasted.

Glimmer of hope during the Santos presidency

As negotiations with other guerrilla groups (including the FARC) were easier due to a greater willingness to compromise and because there were recurring breaches of trust between the government and the ELN, the issue of dialog repeatedly came to nothing(El Tiempo, 30.3.16). From the outset, more work should have been done to resolve this sub-conflict, but decades of neglect, a lack of mutual trust and the ELN's professed willingness to engage in talks made it almost impossible to come together.

It was only under the Santos government (2010-2018) that a mutual ceasefire was reached in September 2017 for the first time in the history of the ELN, which served as the basis for peace talks. However, this did not last long, with the successor Duque government (since 2018) breaking off the dialog after a devastating ELN attack on a police school in 2019(telesur/poonal, 06.02.19). Since then, the ELN has been able to grow rapidly by taking in dissidents and aggressively recruiting former FARC rebels and, in some cases, conquering the power vacuum created by their withdrawal(DW, 16.06.20; DW, 30.03.20; ND, 08.07.20).

The ELN's strategy casts increasing doubt on its political motives, as many of its activities resemble those of criminal gangs rather than those of an ideologically motivated movement (Offstein 2003: 100). It currently has high financial revenues from drug trafficking, illegal mining, human trafficking and smuggling across national borders. However, it is still said to have strong ideological roots today (Nussio 2016: 3).

Israel Ramírez, alias 'Pablo Beltrán', the head of the ELN negotiating delegation in Cuba, constantly emphasizes his group's unbroken desire for peace (just as the FARC once did) and calls for a willingness to compromise(telesur, 06.02.19, EFE, 29.9.20). His statements seem credible, but he probably only represents a small part of his group. The other part continues to represent an anti-state stance, fights against multinational companies or engages in profitable illegal activities. This means that a not insignificant part of the ELN does not seem to find the peace dialog important or even obstructive.

Back to the old pattern: setbacks and possible outside help

For the right-wing conservative President Duque, who is considered an opponent of the peace agreement with the FARC, as well as for his closest international ally, the USA, the ELN is a terrorist group with which negotiations can only be continued on the condition that all hostages are released and all criminal activities cease(ND, 08.07.20). There are therefore few concessions from the government.

Positive influence is currently conceivable, especially from outside: Here, the USA and possibly also the EU could take up important positions on behalf of the Colombian government and motivate it to resume talks. However, they should encourage genuine peace talks with the ELN as part of the prioritized fight against 'narco-terrorism'. This would mean a real rapprochement with mutual compromises. Otherwise, such international 'interference' could well trigger the ELN's anti-imperial stance and have the opposite effect. Cuba, which is close to the ELN, would also be an important mediator in the future.

Conclusion

Based on the predominantly negative experience of almost 40 years of peace efforts and the obvious differences within the guerrilla group, it is difficult to draw a positive future scenario for negotiations with the ELN.

A comprehensive peace agreement is essential for the future of Colombia, but the fronts are hardened. The Duque government can be expected to show little willingness to compromise with the ELN. The actual position of the ELN is ambivalent: on the one hand, the peace delegation asserts its willingness to negotiate, while on the other, its active fighters are in the midst of a bitter struggle that has long since ceased to be based solely on ideology. In addition, an internal group conflict is evident, which oscillates between the will to lay down arms and the ideology of continuing to fight for justice.

On the one hand, this makes it important for the Colombian government to understand the ELN's real concerns and to offer those actively fighting realistic prospects for the future. On the other hand, the guerrillas would be forced to find a unified path that would lead to a change in their organizational form from illegality.

The conflict with the ELN, which may be perceived internationally as 'forgotten', was never 'forgotten' by the Colombian government. Rather, it can be seen as part of a larger whole that always took place in the background until the dissolution of the FARC[11] and was never considered separately. The change in conflict dynamics since 2016, with the ELN as the main actor, has inevitably led to a new prioritization and perception in the Colombian peace process as a whole. It is now important to refocus peace efforts on the ELN as a conflict actor.

Peace can only be achieved if the recurring pattern of rapprochement, rejection, strengthening and radio silence in the history of peace talks with the ELN is broken. However, this will neither be achieved by repeating old models nor by simply making demands. What is needed is a mutual approach, which is just as difficult to imagine under the current Colombian government as it is on the part of a large part of the ELN. This could possibly change with a change of government in the 2022 presidential elections.