By Albert A. Stahel

Very soon after the founding of the EEC - the predecessor organization of the EU - the establishment of a common European security and defence policy was repeatedly discussed. However, all proposals failed due to the disagreement of the EEC member states regarding a common defense policy. Furthermore, the security concerns of Europeans appeared to be secured by the functioning Atlantic NATO alliance. This alliance was broadly supported by the military potential of the USA, for example with its strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany in particular did not want to jeopardize security policy relations between the Europeans and the USA with a competing European defence system.

The election of Donald Trump as President of the USA is likely to have completely changed Europe's strategic situation. Not only did he repeatedly question the existence of NATO before his election and expressed sympathy for Russian President Vladimir Putin, but after his inauguration he and his Secretary of Defense James Mattis called for an immediate increase in Europe's defence spending to at least 2% of gross national product, in line with the decisions made at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales. Although this increase was accepted by all European NATO states then and now, the immediate implementation by individual NATO members is still being questioned. The latter is particularly true for Germany.

In view of these uncertainties about the future of NATO and Russia's armament with tanks, fighter aircraft and ballistic missiles, which has been underway since 2011, as well as the Russian warfare in Syria, the establishment of a separate European security architecture such as PESCO seems urgent. The only problem is, can PESCO be established as a functional defense alliance with integrated staffs and units? The potential for heavy weapons, such as battle tanks and combat aircraft, would also have to be considerably increased by the Europeans. Another problem is the status of French nuclear weapons in a European defense alliance. Could France, with its nuclear weapons, offer itself as a substitute for the US nuclear deterrent strategy for guaranteeing Europe's security? Furthermore, a common armaments policy regarding the development and procurement of weapons would have to be drawn up. Such a common arms policy is lacking today.

If all these questions and problems are not resolved soon, the project of a common defense of Europe could mutate into a castle in the air that would never become a credible substitute for NATO. In this case, PESCO would pretend to be a European security architecture. In view of the military challenges posed by Russia and the pitiful state of the armed forces of individual European states, including Germany, this could further jeopardize Europe's security situation.