The consequences of the Russian attack for the environment, climate and climate policy

VonAnselm Vogler

The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine is jeopardizing human security on a national, regional and global level. Many soldiers have been killed, millions of people have fled and there is evidence of Russian war crimes. The war is also jeopardizing global energy and food supplies. In addition to these consequences, the war also threatens the environment and the climate. It contaminates the local environment with pollutants and contaminated sites for a long time to come. In addition, new emissions are released during combat operations and in response to energy and security policy. The war also poses new challenges for European energy policy.

On February 24, 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine. Since then, war has been raging in the heart of Europe. However, the previous decades were by no means peaceful around the world either. For example, there were civil wars in Libya, Yemen and elsewhere, the "Islamic State" regime ruled in Iraq and Syria, and a military regime in Myanmar. And yet: Putin justifies¹his attack on the second largest country in Europe with historical claims which, according to the Eastern European historian Professor Joachim von Puttkamer, instrumentalize history and are untenable² because they disregard the right of peoples to self-determination and are apparently linked to the desire to permanently annex the occupied territories This has not only shaken many countries in the West. It also threatens to have a global impact on energy and food supplies.

Wars always come at the wrong time. This is true of this one, because the coronavirus pandemic is not yet over and climate change is progressing in parallel. In the weeks following the start of the Russian war of aggression, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its sixth assessment report.⁴ The report makes it clear that climate change is already having serious consequences for life on Earth. The warming of our planet poses an existential risk to our planet's biosphere. Human and animal habitats are at risk of being seriously affected and not enough is being done to limit this danger.

This article discusses the direct environmental and climate impacts of war. It also provides an outlook on the current and possible future consequences of the war for the climate policy of the European Union and some Member States.

Environmental consequences of war

The actions of regular and irregular Russian combat units are causing considerable human suffering in Ukraine. The alleged Russian war crimes in Butsha and other places will leave lasting scars. However, the direct and indirect environmental consequences of the war are less visible. The war is causing enormous long-term environmental destruction in Ukraine. Large industrial plants have been repeatedly affected by the fighting, most recently the Azot chemical plant in Sjewerodonezk. Even plants with radioactive material have been attacked several times.⁵ Several national parks in Ukraine are located in Russian-occupied territory or are being fought over. The Svyati Hory National Park, for example, stretches between the towns of Isyum and Severodonetsk and is therefore in the immediate vicinity of current hostilities. In addition, the firing of ammunition releases pollutants, ammunition residues pollute the soil in the long term and unexploded ordnance will make it dangerous to live in many areas for decades. In Germany, even more than 75 years after the end of the war, World War II munitions are still regularly recovered. It is not uncommon for former military training areas to be subject to access bans due to the dangerous legacy. Increasing forest fires due to climate change further increase the risk of subsequent unexploded ordnance explosions.⁶ When combat vehicles burn out, toxic materials are released, melted rubber and released machine oil seep into the ground. Human Rights Watch also reports that the Russian armed forces havelaid at least seven different types of anti-personnel mines⁷ and fired cluster munitions.⁸ We know from other conflicts the long-term risks posed by this contamination. According to an NGO, several thousand people worldwide die every year in accidents involving landmines or cluster munitions.

Climate impact of the war

There is some evidence that the Russian regime was counting on a quick victory. Putin certainly did not expect a war lasting several months with considerable Russian losses of soldiers and material, massive Western sanctions and sustained Ukrainian resistance. Ukraine's successful resistance is a sine qua non for the continued existence of a sovereign Ukrainian state. With his failed "special operation", Putin has triggered ongoing fighting with considerable greenhouse gas emissions. The predominantly Russian deployment of helicopters, fighter planes and cruise missiles is likely to cause massive emissions. Added to this is the intensive use of Russian¹⁰ artillery in particular, whose propellant charges also release large quantities of particulate matter.¹¹

The increases in global military spending that have already been decided and are still to come shed light on the emissions of armed forces. Even beyond this war, armed forces are responsible for considerableemissions¹² of greenhouse gases. However, the data situation is very poor. The Paris Climate Agreement obliges a number of countries to publish their greenhouse gas emissions. However, they have leeway in reporting the emissions of their military. Researchers reportthat many of these countries do not report or only partially report their military emissions and that the situation is even less transparent for countries that have not committed to reporting their emissions. However, there is much to suggest that emissions from the military are significant. Emissions from the US military are particularly significant. The US military is the largest individual institutionalemitter¹⁴ of greenhouse gases, emitting about as much as Romania in2014¹⁵.

In 2020, the European Commission's External Action Service introduced the Joint EU Climate Change and DefenseRoadmap¹⁶ into the EU legislative process. The European Parliament presented a firstinterimreport¹⁷ on this in April 2022. The further development and implementation of this document will be a gauge of European ambitions in the area of military emissions under the changed conditions caused by the war, especially in light of the fact that the governments of numerous European countries have decided or announced an increase in their defense budgets¹⁸. As long as Russian aggression obstructs the path to disarmament, solutions must at least be found for decoupling, so that an expansion of national and alliance defense no longer goes hand in hand with rising greenhouse gas emissions. Various¹⁹ Western armedforces²⁰ have presented climatestrategies²¹ and the draft bill for the Bundeswehr ProcurementAccelerationAct²² also calls for climate aspects to be taken into account in future procurement projects. However, it remains to be seen how ambitiously these plans will actually be pursued.

Effects of war on climate policy in the European Union

The war has triggered a variety of energy and climate policy reactions in the European Union. Many decision-making processes were already underway before the outbreak of the war, but were partly influenced by the already enormous rise in energy prices and will now continue to develop. Other processes have only just begun and are the subject of political debate. It is therefore still too early to assess this interim status.

The Russian war of aggression initially has considerable implications for European security of supply. It exacerbates the conflict between security of supply and price stability on the one hand and sustainability on the other. The war therefore also places European energy policy at a crossroads. The goal of becoming independent of Russian energy imports can be achieved with an accelerated expansion of renewable energies, but it can also serve to justify a prolonged or increased use of coal energy.

In 2020, the EU member states imported 58% of their energy requirements from Russia. Germany's dependence on Russian gas is particularly noteworthy in this country. In 2020, the German economy imported around 66% of its gas imports from Russia. However, other European countries also covered a considerable²³ proportion of their energy requirements with Russian oil and gas. Since the start of the war, however, Russia has already stopped supplying energy to several European countries²⁴ and is also currently cutting back on supplies to Germany²⁵.

The European Union is responding to the Russian attack with a series of energy policy measures. In May 2022, the European Commission published the "REPowerEU" plan,²⁶ which aims to end energy imports from Russia by 2027. This is to be achieved by switching to other energy suppliers, accelerating the expansion of renewable energies and implementing energy-saving measures.²⁷ The EU's "REPower EU" plan builds on the implementation of the "Fit for 55" plan presented in 2021, for example, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030. In June 2022, the European Parliament decided to support the Commission's proposal to ban the registration of new cars with combustion engines from 2035.²⁸ After some debate, the proposal to strengthen trading in CO2 certificates also received majority support.²⁹ Both proposals are now in the further coordination process with the EU Member States.⁰

At national level, different energy policy reactions and positions on these European climate policy measures can currently be observed. Greece decided³¹ to temporarily increase the reduction of coal, which is particularly harmful to the climate. Poland's Prime Minister also announced³² an increase in domestic coal mining in view of the high energy prices. In Germany, the federal government plans to be largely independent of Russian gas imports from summer 2024³¹ and passed a legislative package for the acceleratedexpansion³⁴ of wind energy. At the same time, however, Vice Chancellor, Energy and Climate Minister Robert Habeck admitted that he would also have to temporarily rely more heavily on coal energy for power generation in order to secure the energy supply.³⁵ The replacement of Russian gas imports also envisages increasing imports of liquefied natural gas. Due to upstream chain emissions, this energy source often has a worse carbonfootprint³⁶ than pipeline gas from Russia or Norway. It is to be expected that a significant proportion of imported liquefied gas will be extracted from unconventional deposits through fracking. In addition, Germany has agreed increased cooperation with Qatar, the world's largest exporter of liquid gas.³⁷ This is problematic in view of the human rights situation in Qatar and the setting of new incentives for fossil fuel exports from the Gulf monarchy. However, there are also no practicable alternatives available in the short term. Nevertheless, the agreement on increased cooperation also includes a declaration of intent to jointly promote hydrogen and energy efficiency technologies.³⁸

Outlook

The Russian attack is causing enormous human suffering in Ukraine. It is also causing massive environmental destruction and directly and indirectly damaging the climate. It will have tangible consequences for decades to come. It presents the European Union and its member states with the energy policy challenge of ensuring security of supply independently of Russian energy imports while causing as little additional climate damage as possible. On the contrary, the rapid conversion of the energy system to renewable energy sources is essential for the future of life on our planet. This conversion is expensive and will in all likelihood not succeed without changes to voters' everyday lives. The looming recession creates additional incentives to delay climate protection measures in order to deal with supposedly more pressing problems. However, those who argue in this way fail to recognize that man-made climate change is already causing considerable damage today and that only rapid and massive reductions in greenhouse gas emissions can prevent a climate catastrophe. Climate protection must not be neglected - no matter what other crises we are facing.

Literature

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About the authors

Anselm Vogler is a research associate at IFSH. Since April 2020, he has been working in the CLICCS Cluster of Excellence at the University of Hamburg in sub-project B3 "Conflict and Cooperation at the Interface of Climate and Security". Anselm Vogler studied political science and history at the Technical University of Dresden and the New School of Social Research in New York City, USA.