This text was originally published in January 2026 on "Living Without Armor." To the original publication.

Information in parentheses: section numbers from the memorandum, unless indicated as page numbers.

1. The major weakness of the Peace Memorandum (FD) only becomes apparent upon a second or third reading.
   It lies in the fact that it does not trust nonviolence.
   It does not trust it at all (at least not much).
   It does not it (at least not really).
   This is as alarming as it is sad and far-reaching.
   
2. Theologically , this is problematic, because by relativizing and marginalizing the idea and practice of nonviolence, one simultaneously marginalizes the one who taught and lived the idea and practice of nonviolence—Jesus himself.
   
   What is initially emphasized as the first “fundamental conviction of the Christian faith”—the “complete renunciation of violence” (p. 20) —is thereby effectively cast aside, as if this were indeed a nice idea, but one that is ethically untenable and (in terms of security) politically useless—even downright irresponsible—in an “unredeemed world.”
   
   This marks a turning point. It is the—admittedly not explicit, but de facto—departure from the idea of nonviolence as a real course of action in the real political present. But when nonviolence is relegated to the realm of the surreal, to the realm of dreams and wishes, it loses all power and relevance.
   
3. Ethically , this is problematic because it effectively advocates (from a church perspective) for violence as a means of conflict resolution and cedes the (political) field to it: Admittedly with regret, but—in an “unredeemed world”—supposedly, unfortunately, unavoidably. This is not a “guide,” but rather a confirmation and reinforcement of the developments observable both nationally and globally.
   
4. Politically , this is problematic because the FD ignores—or at the very least downplays—the indisputable successes of nonviolence (including) in the political sphere. The FD’s claim that the prospects for success of nonviolent resistance in defending against an occupying power are “empirically hardly substantiated” (17), is diametrically opposed to the current state of research.
   
   Had this been taken into account, it would have fundamentally altered the underlying tone of the FD . The fact that these research findings were not acknowledged or taken seriously during an editorial process spanning several years—including four consultation meetings—is, at the very least, perplexing.
   
5. Since the power of nonviolence as a viable option for conflict resolution (even) in highly escalated conflicts, the FD opts for the solution of the use of violence . Although the “primacy of nonviolence” is acknowledged on a few occasions, in practice the FD submits to the primacy of security logic and consistently follows it.
   
6. For this reason, the FD initially goes to great lengths to explain in detail that the primary task is “protection from violence,” which it posits as both a prerequisite and the most important aspect of a “just peace.” Entirely in line with the logic of security, “protection from violence” is presented as the most valuable good par excellence. In a second, albeit minor, step, the “threat and use of violence” (13) is then ethically justified in the interest of this protection from violence: as “sometimes unavoidable” (183), ethically required (155, 159), or even as an act of charity (163)—though, of course, “solely as force that upholds the law” (pp. 19; 33) and as a “last resort” (e.g., p. 19).
   
   Anyone who has accepted this as well then learns, in the third step, that high and even higher defense spending is necessary and that conscription must be supported. While military service is neither better nor worse than civilian service, the special status of “protection against violence” does, after all, “immediately suggest prioritizing service in the Bundeswehr” (169). Moreover: “Soldiers serve the cause of just peace” (173).
   
7. In this context, the FD also argues that while nuclear weapons “cannot be ethically justified in any way” and “from an ethical perspective, the possession, threat of, and use of nuclear weapons” (144), their possession could “nevertheless be politically necessary” (p. 15, point 6), and in extreme cases, the use of nuclear weapons is “not permitted, but merely not prohibited without exception” (ibid.), and that renouncing nuclear weapons is currently “hardly politically justifiable” (145). These are remarkable twists of logic, especially in a text that claims to be “ethical guidance” rather than security policy tutoring.
   
8. The strong emphasis on protection against violence and the ethical legitimization of (counter)violence derived from it reveals another flaw in reasoning: Before the violation by violence comes the outbreak of violence. The Threat to life and limb caused by violence is the consequence, the cause of this is the violent escalation
   
   In this respect, the best protection against violence—and thus the FD’s primary concern—would be to identify and demand measures to prevent the outbreak of violence. Instead, the FD—keyword “unredeemed world”—resigns itself to violence and merely calls for people to arm themselves against its consequences, particularly by expanding the supposedly (!) deterrent capabilities for counter-violence.
   
   This is reminiscent of discussions about climate change: Shouldn’t the first priority be to combat its causes, rather than resignedly seeking to “adapt” to or “prepare for” the dire consequences? The FD, however, takes a purely reactive stance: defend and resist—instead of taking preventive action, instead of proactively and preventively addressing the threat and preventing its escalation.
   
   Crisis prevention, peace education, or nonviolent resistance are mentioned only very occasionally, but in such a subordinate and dismissive manner—in parenthetical or afterthoughts—that this does not even serve as a fig leaf to conceal the FD’s argumentative shortcomings regarding the prevention of violence and escalation.
   
9. Without explicitly naming them, the second and third “fundamental convictions of the Christian faith” formulated in the FD—namely, realpolitik or security policy as understood by those responsible for the FD—are also implicitly sidelined: the commandment to love one’s neighbor and love for one’s enemies and that every human being is “an equal creature of God” (p. 20). Like the renunciation of violence, these are acknowledged as ethically important, but are never seriously considered as a fundamental stance for political thought and action.
   
10. Thus, in the end, the only fundamental conviction underpinning the FD’s argument is the thesis of the “unredeemed world.” As meaningless as this thesis may be (especially for non-theologians), the FD’s entire ethical justification of violence ultimately rests upon it. This is as sad as it is weak, both theologically and ethically. A single remaining cornerstone is not a viable structure. And talk of the “unredeemed world” must not be used either to undermine the hope for peace (see p. 19) or as an all-too-cheap excuse for supposedly necessary (counter)violence.
    
11. Those in charge of the FD were evidently striving to ensure that the FD was “relevant” and “grounded in reality,” as the saying goes. Consequently, politicians, military officials, and journalists praise the fact that the church has now “arrived in reality.” This is regarded as a compliment and a success; some are proud of it. Yet the FD remains trapped within the reality as it understands it trapped.
    
    It does not formulate a single original idea that leads beyond this “unredeemed” reality it describes. The grandly announced “guidance” amounts to nothing more than one big “Yes, but…”: “Yes, nonviolence is in principle quite fine, but… right now there’s no alternative to violence. Yes, love for one’s enemies—in principle, perhaps a good idea—but this enemy is particularly hostile. Yes, nonviolent resistance—it would be nice, but it just doesn’t work. What a shame.”
    
    So far, so banal—just slightly updated and couched in vague language. This is what we’ve been hearing for centuries; even a staunch warmonger wouldn’t disagree. But do I need the FD—do I need a church—to tell me that today?
    
12. The FD makes no practical suggestions and puts forward no concrete demands regarding how peace could be achieved in this world other than through violence and counter-violence. Even diplomacy, disarmament, and the ban on nuclear weapons remain, for the FD, nothing more than theoretical wishful thinking for a distant future: Not entirely wrong, but not justifiable “at present,” because the language and logic of violence and security reign supreme. The FD accepts this as a given in this “unredeemed world.”
    
    Nor does the FD name any concrete peace-building steps that the church itself should take or promote. It does not assume consistent political responsibility for peace and summarily relegates Christian pacifists of all eras to the theological, ethical, and realpolitik sidelines—accepted as voices of warning or individual pious souls, but not to be taken seriously either ethically or politically.
    
13. “Unredeemed world” or not: For those who have given up faith in the power of nonviolence, what remains? Hopelessness, resignation? Belief in the “myth of redemptive violence”? (Walter Wink)
    
    If the church in these times, in a “world in disarray,” does not do something else, not more to say than this FD, then it has nothing left to say. It renders itself superfluous.