Stateless: The conflict in Rakhine and the humanitarian plight of the Rohingya

By Kristina Roepstorff

Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh is home to the largest refugee camp in the world. Almost one million Rohingya live there, having fled violence and discrimination. In total, around 1.5 of the estimated 2 million Rohingya are on the run. The United Nations and human rights experts speak of a textbook example of ethnic cleansing. The humanitarian consequences pose major challenges for the region and the international community.

The Rohingya are currently considered the most persecuted minority in the world. The predominantly Muslim ethnic group lives - at least until recently - in Myanmar's Rakhine state on the border with Bangladesh. Since August 2017, more than half a million Rohingya have fled to the neighboring country to escape systematic discrimination, violence and reprisals by the Myanmar military. This is just the latest episode in several refugee movements since the country's independence from British colonial power in 1948, which can be traced back to a multi-layered conflict. Tensions between the Rohingya and the Buddhist majority population within Rakhine, as well as a fractured relationship between both population groups and the central government and a nationwide rise in Buddhist nationalism, have contributed to the expulsion of the Rohingya from Myanmar. Today, around 1.5 million of the estimated 2 million Rohingya live in exile, around 1 million of them in refugee camps in Bangladesh. The United Nations and human rights experts speak of a textbook example of ethnic cleansing, which is now also a matter for the International Criminal Court. The humanitarian situation of the refugees is devastating, and any improvement in the near future seems a long way off due to the ongoing conflict in Rakhine.

Who are the Rohingya?

The origin of the current humanitarian crisis unfolding in the region is the violent conflict in Myanmar's western state of Rakhine on the border with Bangladesh. It is reflected particularly succinctly in the controversy surrounding the designation of the affected minority group. The term "Rohingya" is the self-designation of a predominantly Muslim minority in Myanmar that lives (or lived) mainly in the north of Rakhine. They differ both religiously and linguistically from the Buddhist majority population in Rakhine and the rest of the country. The majority of the Rohingya are Sunnis, although some Hindus also belong to this minority. The Rohingya language is related to Bengali-Assamese and therefore belongs to the Indo-Aryan language family. This clearly distinguishes the Rohingya from the majority population, who speak Burmese, a Sino-Tibetan language. The origin and history of the Rohingya is disputed, and the conflict unfolds between different narratives. The Rohingya see themselves as the indigenous population of Rakhine. For the country's Buddhist majority, on the other hand, they are seen as illegal immigrants from the Bengal region - which includes parts of India and Bangladesh - who only moved during British colonial rule. Even historians disagree. While some assume that the Rohingya have always lived in what is now Rakhine and converted to Islam around 1,000 years ago, others attribute their origins to labor migration from Bengal during the colonial era. Researchers agree that the Rohingya are an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous population group whose identity emerged primarily in the wake of Burma's independence in 1948 and the accompanying separatist aspirations of the minorities.

On an international level, the term was adopted and disseminated in reports on human rights violations in the course of massive military operations in Rakhine in the 1990s. However, the Buddhist majority population of Myanmar and also the government vehemently reject the name - they call them Bengalis. The use of the term by various international heads of state and organizations has already led to diplomatic tensions.

The context of the conflict

The controversy surrounding the affiliation of the Rohingya and the conflict between the minority and the Buddhist majority population of the Arakanese Rakhine can look back on a long history. Among other things, the Rohingya are accused of fighting on the side of the British during the Second World War and thus against the Buddhist population allied with the Japanese. Even then, there was inter-communal violence between the two population groups. When the British colonial empire dissolved, the Rohingya did not want to be part of independent, predominantly Buddhist Burma, but wanted to join East Pakistan - today's Bangladesh. This led to an unsuccessful guerrilla struggle against Burma's central government. The demand for the secession of parts of Rakhine in the years following independence further fueled the conflict with the Buddhist population of Rakhine. However, the Rohingya were not alone in their desire for autonomy. To this day, the country is characterized by a multitude of separatist (ethnicized) conflicts, such as those in Kachin on the Chinese border. The Arakanese, who trace their origins back to the Kingdom of Arakan and are themselves one of the country's many minorities, are also in conflict with the central government and have long been demanding more autonomy. The fact that the region was severely neglected by the center as a periphery under decades of military rule has further fueled the conflict. To this day, Rakhine is one of the poorest states in Myanmar.

A further escalation in the conflict in Rakhine was the reform of the Nationality Law in 1982. This only grants full citizenship to those minority groups that were resident in the territory of present-day Myanmar before the beginning of British colonial rule in 1823. Unlike the Arakanese, the Rohingya were not recognized as one of these 135 minorities and have been stateless ever since - with the result that they are denied a number of rights and are subject to massive discrimination. Their everyday life is characterized by travel restrictions, special taxes, forced labour and marriage restrictions. It should be noted that other Muslim minorities, such as the Kaman, are not subject to the same discrimination and have been recognized as a minority despite rising anti-Islamic resentment in Myanmar.

Anti-Muslim resentment coupled with radical Buddhist nationalism, which exacerbated inter-communal tensions in the wake of the country's democratic opening in 2011 and is reflected in a rise in hate speech, continues to fuel the conflict. In 2012, inter-communal violence erupted in Rakhine, killing 192 people, injuring another 265 and destroying more than 8,500 homes. The Rohingya were disproportionately affected. Since then, more than 120,000 of them have been living in camps for internally displaced persons in Rakhine under extremely difficult conditions. Further episodes of violence and massive military offensives in the years that followed led to further displacement and exacerbated tensions between the population groups. Nobel Peace Prize winner and political icon Aung San Suu Kyi, who was seen as a beacon of hope for the country's democratic future and has de facto ruled the country since the first free elections in 2015, has come under massive international criticism for her hesitant stance in the conflict. Her stance could be explained by the fact that she continues to rely on the cooperation of the influential military, which still holds 25% of the seats in parliament under the 2008 constitution, but also wants to perform a balancing act to meet the demands of the Arakanese and the country's Buddhist majority population. In this complex situation, the Myanmar government and the Buddhist majority population of Rakhine feel misunderstood by the international community. Resentment towards international actors, who are perceived as biased, has repeatedly led to riots and protests and severely restricted the scope of action for humanitarian actors in Rakhine.

Displacement and flight

Structural discrimination, repeated outbreaks of inter-communal violence and a series of military offensives have repeatedly led to displacement of the Rohingya since independence. Especially in 1962, 1978 and 1991-1992, thousands fled across the border to Bangladesh. But it is not only in Bangladesh that Rohingya live in refugee camps. Others fled by land and sea to other countries, where they often live in prison-like camps. In 2015, for example, Rohingya made headlines as boat refugees when they drifted for weeks in the Andaman Sea after the responsible trafficking networks were broken up and those responsible arrested in response to the discovery of mass graves in Thailand and Malaysia.

The situation has worsened dramatically in recent years due to further military offensives, particularly in northern Rakhine. In August 2017, the violence escalated again when the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ASRA) - a Rohingya rebel group founded in 2016 - carried out attacks on police posts in northern Rakhine. The counter-offensive by the army and police, as well as inter-communal violence, drove around 700,000 Rohingya to flee within two months. The human rights organization Human Rights Watch estimates that around 288 Rohingya villages were destroyed. Survivors report torture, rape and other atrocities. The violence against the Rohingya has been described by international human rights experts as ethnic cleansing and genocide. According to the few reports available, there is not much left of the Rohingya villages in northern Rakhine. They have either been destroyed by bulldozers or other population groups have settled there - or the land is now being used for military purposes. However, the exact situation is difficult to assess, as the government largely refuses entry to journalists, aid organizations and human rights observers.

A worsening humanitarian emergency

One thing is clear, however: the humanitarian situation of the Rohingya in Rakhine and neighboring countries has worsened since the conflict escalated in August 2017. In Myanmar, travel restrictions for internally displaced persons and a lack of access to basic medical care have led to a devastating humanitarian emergency. Their situation is dramatic. They have been deprived of their livelihoods, their homes have been destroyed and they are suffering from malnutrition and poverty. Humanitarian aid organizations have hardly any access to provide the necessary help. Many Rohingya are therefore still trying to flee across the border to Bangladesh. There are currently more than 1 million Rohingya in the neighboring country. Most of them are settling in the existing refugee camp in Cox's Bazar - which has now grown to become the largest refugee camp in the world with 905,000 inhabitants (as of May 24, 2018). Here, too, the need for humanitarian aid is enormous. In addition to the Bangladeshi army and the national administration, more than 30 local and international organizations are active on the ground. Bangladesh itself is one of the poorest countries in the region and is dependent on international support due to the high number of people seeking protection.

In addition, the monsoon threatens the refugee camps, where people live in simple huts made of tarpaulins and planks built on deforested hills - and are defenceless against landslides and flooding. The Bangladeshi government's plan to house Rohingya in shelters on the offshore island of Bhashan Char has led to strong criticism from humanitarian organizations, as the island has no infrastructure and is at risk of flooding.

Although Myanmar and Bangladesh bilaterally agreed on a return plan in November 2017, this has not yet been implemented. This is mainly due to the lack of important concessions on the part of Myanmar to grant the Rohingya basic rights - such as citizenship. The Rohingya are also not to return to their villages for the time being, but are to be housed in specially set up reception camps. It is therefore not surprising that many are currently unwilling to return to Myanmar voluntarily. But Bangladesh is not the only country receiving refugees; the entire region is affected by the consequences of the conflict in Rakhine. Thousands of Rohingya live in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, often in camps under similarly difficult conditions. India, where around 40,000 Rohingya have sought refuge, wants to deport them to Bangladesh. As recently as May 2018, refugee boats were again sailing in the Andaman Sea. One was allowed to stop briefly in Thailand, but was then sent back out to sea towards Malaysia with a few food supplies and the bare essentials.

Outlook

The Bangladeshi government and humanitarian actors must prepare themselves for the fact that the Rohingya will remain in the camps for the foreseeable future. So far, Bangladesh has been open to the refugees. It remains to be seen whether the mood will change after the elections in December 2018 and with increasing pressure on the host society. Repatriation is currently not an option given the security situation and the ongoing conflict in Rakhine. The fact that Aung San Suu Kyi has now agreed to involve the UN in the repatriation of the refugees is an initial positive sign. Implementing the recommendations of the commission of inquiry set up by the Myanmar government and chaired by Kofi Annan, which published its report last year, would be another important step in the right direction. Among other things, the report calls for improved access for humanitarian organizations and the media to the conflict region, a review of the citizenship law, the closure of camps for internally displaced persons and greater cooperation with Bangladesh. A long-term solution to the conflict, which is a toxic mix of historical resentment, center-periphery tensions, inter-communal and inter-religious violence and extreme poverty, will not be easy. A response to the current humanitarian emergency must also address these root causes. In addition to investing in the development of the region, it also requires peace-building measures, reconciliation between the two population groups, strong action against hate speech and improved relations between the central government and the Buddhist majority population of Rakhine. There is still a long way to go.

About the authors

Dr. Kristina Roepstorff is a research associate at the Chair of International Relations at Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, where she teaches in the Peace and Conflict Studies Master's program. Her research and teaching focuses primarily on humanitarian aid, forced migration and peacebuilding. As part of her current research on local humanitarian actors, she conducted her first field research in Rakhine in 2013.