How Protests against MONUSCO shape the Discourse around Peacekeeping in the DR Congo
By Lucas Steinbach
Peacekeeping Operations are considered one of the most effective tools available to the UN to support a member state on its path from conflict to peace. Yet, their effectiveness does not go unquestioned: In the past years, protests against the peacekeeping operation in the DR Congo have spiraled in the eastern provinces of the country. This has strongly influenced the discourse around the UN peacekeeping operation MONUSCO and led to the decision of withdrawing the mission early by the end of 2024. This article sheds light on this dynamic and contextualizes the impact of local resistance on international peacebuilding efforts in the country.
Introduction
The eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have witnessed a series of violent protests against the United Nations peacekeeping operation MONUSCO in recent years. Protesters condemn the United Nations’ (UN) apparent ineffectiveness and inability to protect civilians against armed groups and demand more national agency and ownership of the peacebuilding process. These positions are supported by political powers including the government of the country, which lead to an accelerated end of the mission by the end of 2024. This shows how the local discourse around MONUSCO shaped the local legitimacy of the mission and led to the demand of its withdrawal. This blog entry will explore the positions within local resistance movements against the peacekeeping operation and explain how they challenge the presence of international forces.
The UN in the DR Congo and Deteriorating Local Legitimacy
To better understand the current dynamics, it is helpful to briefly look at the long history of the peacekeeping operation and its development over the years. In 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandated the peacekeeping operation MONUC to assist the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the second Congo War in its peace process. After successful elections in 2006 and an improving situation in the country, MONUC was amended to a stabilization mission under the acronym of MONUSCO in 2010 with a focus on the eastern provinces, where conflicts had regionalized. Although MONUSCO took a robust stance and was equipped with an intervention brigade to “neutralize and disarm” armed forces, there are still more than 120 armed groups operating in the region, and until today, violence prevails.
Hence, it is no surprise that the populations’ satisfaction with the mission in the conflict affected areas has taken severe damage over the past years. The limited effectiveness and successes in the stabilization of the region, protection of civilians and the claim that the UN is unable to address deeply embedded conflicts have undermined the UN’s reputation. During recent protests, activists have increasingly demanded the removal of the UN’s forces from Congolese soil, and requested for more agency of the government and its forces to overtake the role of the UN. With the overall effectiveness already being questioned, the eroding local legitimacy[1] (Whalan, 2017) further undermines MONUSCO’s ability to “help [the] countr[y] navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace”.
When looking at the protesters’ claims, the public opinion on the UN peacekeeping operation is far from ideal and there is limited trust in the international institution. There is a perceived indifference of the UN towards local needs and interests. As such, witnessing the relatively high living standards of UN officials and peacekeepers in contrast to their own, protesters claim that peacekeepers follow their own economic interests instead of supporting them. Likewise, the UN is perceived as unresponsive to the problems at stake: Although there is an affiliation between the Rwandan state and certain rebel groups, like the M23, the UN has not sufficiently acted upon the international interference of the neighboring state in the conflict. UN officials have even resigned over their limited capability to fight back armed groups, which has led protesters to the conclusion that the UN accepts violence and insecurity. Similar accusations have also been brought forward during the inadequate management during the Ebola pandemic and frequent attacks from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a militia with political aspirations in Uganda. Civilians in the affected regions explain the lacking support as a result of a governmental and international conspiracy against them. Whether such allegations are correct or not may be debated, however the distrust in the UN peacekeeping structure in the country has already deteriorated the local support of the mission, undermining an important pillar for the success of the mission.
Simultaneously to the lack of action of MONUSCO, the agency of the conflict affected people is largely restricted. This prevents so-called local ownership, notably the ability of the citizens and the state to determine the peace process under their terms and hence challenges the local legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission (Hellmüller, 2012). Mechanisms to understand the perspectives of civil society appear vastly absent, although activists claim that only they themselves can be responsible for conflict resolution and sustainable peace. Yet, as Sarah von Billerbeck demonstrates in her book “Whose Peace”, the peace process during UN peacekeeping operations seldom fosters self-determination but follows more liberal approaches (2016).
Now, especially young people who grew up after the second Congo War, who have only experienced violent conflicts, are now calling for more agency. Youth in the DRC thus follow youth movements in other countries of the African continent, such as Sierra Leone, Guinea, Burkina Faso, South Africa, Sudan or Kenya, where young people request political reforms, economic opportunities for youth and social justice. In the DRC, however, youth demonstrate not just against national elites that hinder youth engagement, but also against international forces.
Another reason for the strong opposition against the peacekeeping operation in the DRC is the perception of peacekeepers as perpetrators of violence against the civilian population. During demonstrations and attacks on UN military bases, civilians were killed by peacekeepers and national armed forces. Likewise, sexual abuse and rape have been prominent issues peacekeepers were accused of. Despite the UN’s attempt to deal with said issues, such instances foster ressentiments against the UN presence and have not only impacted the public opinion among the civilian population in the eastern provinces but also led the DRC’s government to take a stance against the UN operation and demanding its withdrawal. Again, the DRC is not an isolated case, but the UN missions in the Central African Republic, Haiti, and Somalia faced similar accusations. This heavily impacts the local legitimacy of a peacekeeping operation, and in the case of the DRC has intensified the resistance against MONUSCO.
Political Actions to End the UN Presence
The dissatisfaction of protesters with MONUSCO is also reflected in the positioning of DR Congo’s politicians. Following official statements, the UN force is ineffective in protecting civilians from armed groups and militias. The mission has not been able to control rebellions, resolve armed conflict, or prevent crimes against humanity and violations of human rights by peacekeepers. Therefore, government officials too have called for the withdrawal of forces and the imposition of sanctions on peacekeepers who committed such crimes. On an international level, during the 78th session of the General Assembly in 2023, the president called for a gradual withdrawal of the operation to consolidate the progress made in the country. Following the demonstrations and violent clashes between peacekeepers and protesters, the Congolese government invoked an accelerated withdrawal of UN troops starting by the end 2023 instead of 2024. The political discourse at the national level, although not as explicit in its criticisms and demands as local protesters, has informed political actions. In late 2023, the foreign Affairs Minister Christophe Lutundula and the UN’s top official in DRC, Bintou Keita, signed agreements to end the presence of MONUSCO after more than 25 years of deployment.
Although the UN has come to terms with the end of MONUSCO, UN officials have criticized the claims of protesters and state officials. MONUSCO had not been the solution to the DRC’s crises and only supported the state to bring stability. Bintou Keita stated that the responsibility for security and protection of civilians lies with the national forces and excessive expectations towards the mission are a result of the inadequate communications on the capabilities and responsibilities of the mission. Whether such statements can address the positions and interests of protesters is however questionable.
Concluding Thoughts
The case of MONUSCO demonstrates that the discourse within local resistance movement against the peacekeeping operation was powerful enough to determine the operation’s fate. The discourse on MONUSCO, mostly determined by the perception of an ineffective mission among the civil society in the eastern provinces, has formed the public opinion to remove the force from Congolese ground and influenced government officials to pursue the withdrawal process of the peacekeeping mission. This may be a lesson learned for the UN. Even if certain expectations of protesters cannot be met simply because peacekeeping is supposed to facilitate and not lead a peace process, there are underlying issues that may be addressed in other operations, such as a more comprehensive realisation of local ownership and a closer communication with local forces on the abilities of the mission. This case also demonstrates that peacekeeping operations not only have to respond to local needs and expectations, but also have to accommodate the interests of the host country - at times a challenging space to navigate.
[1] Local legitimacy describes the national and/or local support of the peacekeeping operation. Without legitimacy, an operation cannot function properly since it cannot maintain the host nation’s support for its actions.
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About the author
![Portrait Lucas Steinbach](/fileadmin/_processed_/0/2/csm_2024_Portrait_Lucas_Steinbach_548051a355.jpg)
Lucas Steinbach is a PhD student at the UC Louvain. His research focusses on the use of force in the UN peacekeeping operation in the DR Congo and the perceptions of peacekeepers on their force application in the field. He works as a consultant and trainer in the fields of feminisms and development, anti-discrimination, refuge, and transcultural communication for organization such as the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, the Beisheim Foundation, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, medica mondiale, and Plan International.